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INTRODUCTION 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have developed a theory of interpersonal 
relationships based prlnarlly on the assumption that "... most socially 
significant behavior will not be repeated unless it is reinforced, rewarded 
In some way (p. 5)»" They begin their analysis with the simplest of all 
interpersonal situations, the dyad. It is reasoned that all dyadic 
relationships can be evaluated In terms of the positive components 
(rewards) and negative components (costs) which accrue to the members of 
the dyad. 
According to Thibaut and Kelley (1959)» the essence of an inter­
personal relationship is interaction. By Interacting, the individuals 
create products for each other in terms of rewards and costs (to do this 
they behave in the presence of one another or communicate with one another). 
This interacting behavior can take many forms from the casual conversation 
of fellow travelers to the formalized give-and-take of international 
negotiations. 
The present study attempted to relate Thibaut and Kelley's theory 
of interpersonal relationships to a particular type of dyadic interaction 
called bargaining. Bargaining Involves a situation in which individuals 
have reasons to, at one and the same time, cooperate and compete with one 
another. It has thus been called a mixed-motive relationship (Schelling, 
I960). 
Various bargaining behaviors and outcomes, as a function of several 
negotiation and prenegotiation variablea, can be predicted using Thibaut 
and Kelley's theoretical concepts; several predictions were derived and 
tested in this study. 
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The Dyadic Relationship 
For a dyadic relationship to exist, four basic requirements must 
be met (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959)» First the individuals must have an 
opportunity to interact (temporal and spatial prerequisites). Second, 
there must exist a range of payoffs contingent on the .joint behavior of the 
dyad members. Third, the individuals must, from past experience, from 
the process of exploration, or from the assimilation of information from 
other means, be capable of discovering what the behavioral contingencies 
and possible payoffs are. Fourth, the payoff an individual receives as a 
member of a dyad, must exceed the payoff available to him from any other 
possible dyad. As long as these requirements are met, the dyad or group 
will be a viable and enduring entity. 
The specific spatial and temporal prerequisites for dyadic interaction 
will not be discussed here. Although It would seem useful to investigate 
the optimum physical conditions for group formation, the focus of this 
paper is on the process of dyadic interaction itself rather than the 
basic physical requirements for dyadic Interaction, 
The second requirement for a dyadic relationship specifies, in effect, 
that a contingency matrix of payoffs for the dyad members must exist. The 
word contingent is very important. If a person could determine his own 
reward-cost outcomes without regard to the behavior of another person 
there would be no need for an Interaction, Thus, In any interaction, the 
payoff an individual receives for a particular behavior depends. In part, 
on the behavior of hit; fellow dyad member or fellow group members. 
In the phrase "contingency matrix", the word matrix is also very 
importante The following is a hypothetical payoff matrix for a two-person 
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InteractionI A 
3-1 ^2 
+2, +2 -4, 
B 
b2 +4, -4 -2, -2 
Person A can choose behaviors and ag. Person B can choose behaviors 
bj^ and b2. The values in the matrix represent payoffs (rewards minus 
costs) for the different behavioral combinations. Of course, the 
behavioral choices for Individuals in any interaction typically exceeds 
two; nevertheless, the 2x2 matrix is a useful tool for illustrating both 
the contingency of the behaviors and the types of relationship which can 
exist. Thus the 2x2 matrix is a simplified version of more complex 
matrices which are assumed to actually exist in any dyadic relationship, 
and which specify the payoff to the dyad members for various behavioral 
combinations. 
The pattern of payoffs in the matrix determines the type of relation­
ship which exists. The type of interaction specified by the above matrix, 
and the type which will be examined In this study is called the mixed-
motive situation. It is called mixed-motive because there is some 
advantage and disadvantage in both cooperation and competition between dyad 
members. In the above matrix, the combination of the a^ and b^ behaviors 
is the cooperative set. Both A and B would receive a payoff of 2 for this 
combination. However, A (if B made the a cooperative response) could make 
twice as much by competing (choosing ag). On the other hand, A would risk 
receiving a negative payoff If B also chose to compete. B faces the same 
choice dilemma as A. 
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In giime theory terms the analog of the mixed-motive situation is the 
non-zero sum game (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953)* Examples in real 
life include all types of bargaining situations from labor-management 
negotiations to the haggling one does with the local automobile dealer. 
The mixed-motive situation or conflict, in fact, characterizes any group 
interaction which is neither purely cooperative or purely competitive. 
Since Individuals interact often, and very few of these interactions are 
pure cooperation or pure competition (Harsanyi, 1966j Kelley and Thibaut, 
1969), it follows that mixed-motive conflicts are common. 
The third requirement for dyadic interactions is that the dyad 
members be capable of discovering what the behavioral contingencies and 
possible payoffs are. The individuals must, in some way, gather information 
about the values in the payoff matrix. This information can be based on 
personal past or present experienced outcomes (as for instance in a dating 
relationship), or based on communication from an outside source (as when 
the exchange value of a certain product is dictated by various economic 
factors). 
It should be noted that this requirement specifies that a dyad 
member know at least his own payoffs for the various behavioral contingencies. 
Thus, for a dyadic interaction to exist an individual need not know his 
partner's (or "opponent's", as he might be referred to in a mixed-motive 
conflict) payoffs; but the presence or absence of this information is 
assumed to have important differential effects on the Interaction process 
and bargaining outcomes. These differences are discussed in a subsequent 
section. 
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Once the dyad has been formed, and the members know, at least, 
about their own possible payoffs, how do the individuals evaluate the 
interaction? The individuals must decide or evaluate by means of some 
standard whether or not the payoffs from the relationship are acceptable. 
Kelley and Thibaut (19^9) proposed two types of standards as follows; 
The first of these, called the comparison level 
(or GL), is the standard against which the members 
evaluate the 'attractiveness* of the relation­
ship or how satisfactory it is. The second, called 
the comparison level for alternatives (or GL alt), 
is the standard the member uses in deciding whether 
to remain in or to leave the relationship (p. 2l), 
Kelley and Thibaut have not been the only ones to stress the above 
two standards. For instance Pruitt and Drews (19^9) refer to "... the 
level of value a negotiator realistically hopes to achieve from the 
negotiation," as the "forward goal (p. 44)." Similarly, this forward 
goal has been called "level of aspiration" (Siegel and Fouraker, I96O) 
and "target point" (Walton and McKersie, I965). In contrast Pruitt and 
Drews (l9'^9) refer to "... the level of value he is minimally willing to 
accept in the negotiated agreement," as the "minim,! goal (p. 44)." The 
minimum goal has also been called "the resistance point" (Walton and 
McKersie, I965) sind "break-off point" (Kelley, 19^6). Nevertheless, 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have made the most extensive and complete use 
of the concepts of GL and GL alt in terms of dyadic interactions. 
The GL is the standard a person has which indicates what he thinks he 
deserves in a relationship. The location of the GL on a person's scale 
of outcomes is based on past experience with other interactions or is 
decided on the basis of information about possible payoffs from present 
relationships. If a person receives payoffs above his GL, he will be 
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aatisfled with the relationship. If the payoffs are below the CL, a 
person will be dissatisfied and will be motivated to seek new behavioral 
combinations which might bring his payoff above his GL. 
The CL alt is derived from the best possible alternative (in terms 
of payoff) that a person can receive from any other relationship. As a 
standard, the CL alt determines the lowest value of outcomes that a person 
will accept as a member of a particular dyad. If a person's payoff falls 
below his CL alt, he will terminate the relationship. Thus, a payoff 
must be above an individual's CL alt in order for the fourth requirement 
for a dyadic interaction to be satisfied. 
When an individual's payoff is above his CL alt, It may either be 
above or below his CL, If it is below, the individual will continue in 
the relationship, but will not be satisfied and will seek better outcomes. 
Dyad members receiving payoffs above both their CL's and GL alt's will be 
content and will try to maintain the status quo (as long as the CL's and 
GL alt's remain the same, of course). 
In the present study, the first three requirements for a dyadic 
relationship were met by Involving laboratory subjects in a simulated 
buyer-seller game. However, half the subjects knew only their own 
possible payoffs, while the other half knew both their own and their 
opponents payoff matrices. The purpose of the study was to investigate 
what effect this difference in available Information has on the standard 
individuals use to evaluate their dyads. In other words, how are these 
differences in Information related to the values picked as CL's and GL 
alt's? 
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In addition to the information variable, the effect of the type of 
activity engaged in by the subjects between the presentation of the 
information and the actual dyadic interaction was studied. Half the 
subjects formed a definite bargaining strategy and half did not. Also 
half of the subjects prepared for the dyadic interaction in the presence of 
other subjects (who assumed the same bargaining role), and half prepared 
alone» How these prenegotiation conditions affect the setting of the GL's 
and CL alt's was tested. 
Finally, this study examined how GL's and CL alt's relate to the 
behaviors and outcomes in a mixed-motive conflict situation. 
Independent Variables 
Information 
Each bargainer in a mixed-motive situation has a payoff matrix based 
on certain behavioral contingencies, a CL, and a GL alt (these three bits 
of information will be referred to as a person's bargaining position). In 
fact, the requirements for a dyadic relationship specify only that a 
person know his own bargaining position and not that of his opponent 
(except each bargainer must know the behaviors required of his opponent 
for the different payoffs). Not only is knowledge of an opponent's 
bargaining position not needed for the existence of the relationship, in 
reality it is rarely, if ever, present (Harsanyi, 1962} Ikle and Leites, 
1962; Kuhn, 1962; Quandt, I961). 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) discussed the implications for the 
bargaining process of this lack of information about a bargaining opponent. 
In their theory of dyadic relationships, two competing tendencies are 
proposed. The first is the tendency for individuals to maximize their 
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payoffs In any dyadic interaction. The second Is the inclination to avoid 
competing behavior, that Is, behaviors, which drop one or both of the 
bargainers below the CL alt thus terminating the relationship. In keeping 
with the first tendency, a bargainer will transmit information about his 
own bargaining position to the opponent (although, possibly not with 
complete veracity). The second tendency will compel the bargainers to seek 
information about their opponents' bargaining positions. 
This analysis of information and bargaining was expanded by Kelley 
and Thibaut (1969). As In the earlier work, they stressed the fact that 
to bargain effectively, bargainers must transmit Information about them­
selves and also find out certain things about their opponents. However, 
they also point out that if a bargainer reveals his own entire bargaining 
position (truthfully), he may put himself at a disadvantage. If a pwrson's 
opponent has that information, that person might be forced to agree to a 
minimally acceptable offer. Thus, informational dilemmas are created 
(Kelley, I966; Kelley and Thibaut, I969). There is an advantage to 
transmitting information about oneself, but a disadvantage in revealing all 
aspects of one's bargaining position. Second, there is advantage in 
gaining information about one's opponent, but it is difficult to do this 
without divulging information about oneself. Third, if an opponent does 
reveal information about himself, how can one be sure of the truthfulness 
of the information? 
Although articulated best by Kelley and Thibaut (19^9), this 
Informational Interdependence of bargaining partners has been discussed by 
economists (Siegel and Fouraker, 196O; Stevens, 19^3)» political scientists 
and sociologists (Coser, 1963; Quandt, 19^1)» game theorists 
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(Harsanyi, 1962, 1966), psychologists (Kelley, I966; Kelley et al,, 19^7; 
Llebert et al., I968), and industrial relations researchers (Cummings; and 
Harnett, 1969? Walton and McKersie, 1965)» 
The above informational dilemmas lead to behavioral dilemmas. A 
person must decide whether to take a "hard" or "soft" bargaining line 
(for instance, in terms of level of bids), whether to be secretive or 
open, whether to be deceitful or honest, and whether to be suspicious or 
trusting. 
Kelley (1966) interpreted all bargaining behavior as attempts to 
solve the behavioral dilemmas inherent in a mixed-motive situation. He 
devised a mixed-motive game to find what the typical solutions to the 
dilemmas were. Very briefly, Kelley found that subjects who bargained 
wihtout initial information about their opponents began the bidding with 
high demands, avoided early committment to a final offer, made very 
minimal concessions, tried to influence opponents to make concessions, 
attempted to deceive the opponent concerning alternatives, and sought 
Information concerning a reasonable expectation» Kelley concluded that 
the above behaviors did in fact represent attempts to resolve the 
behavioral dilemmas. 
Kelley et al, (lyo?) also studied the relationship between information 
and bargaining behavior. As in the above study, bargainers knew only 
their own payoff functions and alternatives. Again, it was found that 
these bargainers made high initial bids, deceived their opponents, and 
often withdrew from potentially profitable negotiations. 
The above studies provide some evidence concerning the types of 
behaviors exhibited by bargainers with incomplete information about their 
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opponents. It remained to be seen whether the behaviors would be 
different if a different amount of information (although incomplete) were 
available. For Instance, as information about opponents increases would 
bargainers become less deceitful, would initial bids become lower, would 
concessions become greater, and would bargaining times be reduced. It was 
the purpose of this study to test these and other possibilities, 
Siegel and Fouraker (196O) have compared the negotiations of 
bargainers using two information conditions. In one condition bargainers 
knew both their own and their opponents payoff matrices. In the other 
condition, bargainers knew only their own payoffs. It was found that as 
mutual information increased, bargainers became more realistic in their 
demands, arrived at more equitable contracts, reached solutions which 
were generally closer to the greatest potential mutual payoff, and took 
less time to arrive at an agreement. It is unfortunate, however, that 
Siegel and Fouraker compared incompletely informed bargainers with 
completely informed bargainers. As was mentioned before, bargainers are 
rarely, if ever, completely Informed about an opponent's bargaining position. 
The present study compared two levels of incomplete information, 
Prenegotiation activity 
What effect does prenegotiation experience (besides the learning of 
possible payoffs and alternatives) have on bargaining behavior and 
bargaining outcomes? Two areas of research come to bear on this problem; 
research on strategy versus no strategy formation, and research on the 
effects of a group on individual decision making. 
Strategy versus no strategy Druckman (196?) investigated the 
effects of various types of prenegotiation activity on bargaining behavior 
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using a simulated labor-management negotiation game. The prenegotiation 
conditions were as follows; (l) subjects, assembled into groups of three, 
were told to form a definite bargaining strategy, and (2) three-man 
groups were told to simply discuss the issues with opposing three-man 
groups (no interteam competition was allowed)» Druckman found that when 
subjects formed strategies in a group and then bargained as individuals 
(the dyad was the unit of analysis), they took longer to reach a contract, 
were further apart on contracts not reached, had more unresolved issues, 
and yielded less from their initial bids than did subjects who participated 
in a discussion before bargaining. 
The above study was replicated by Druckman (1968) and the same results 
obtained. He also added two conditions* (3) instead of discussing the 
issues with an opposing group, three-man groups discussed the issues 
among themselves, without forming a strategy (the same as condition 1 
above, without the strategy), and (4) individuals bargained without prior 
group experience. It was found that the individual bargainers (condition 
k) did not differ from the strategy group of the first study (condition l) 
on the dependent variables. Also the unilateral discussion groups of the 
second study (condition 3) did not differ from the bilateral discussion 
groups of the first and second study (condition 2), Druckman concluded 
that, "strategy experience before bargaining led to a hardening of 
positions as reflected in measures of agreement and amount of yielding 
(p, 288)," In contrast, pre-bargaining discussion (whether with one's own 
group or an opposing group) led to faster agreement and more yielding, 
Bass (19^6) used the same prenegotiation experiences and essentially 
the same task as in the Druckman studies. He also added an Individual 
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strategy condition. Thus group-strategy, group-discussion, individual-
strategy, and individual-study conditions were compared. For the present 
analysis, only the strategy versus no strategy conditions are important. 
The only consistent finding was that strategy groups were likely to be 
deadlocked in bargaining more often than the study or discussion conditions 
(but only when deadlines were imposed on bargaining time). Thus Bass' 
study did not produce the strong and consistent strategy - no strategy 
difference as found in the Druckman studies. 
What produced the differences between the Bass and Druckman results 
is difficult to determine. However, both studies did confound the 
variable discussed in the previous section: information. For instance, 
the subjects could Include in their discussion any general knowledge they 
had about labor-management negotiations. No control existed over the 
type of information injected into the prenegotiation discussion. It is 
reasonable to suspect that individuals who were told to discuss or study 
the issues had brought out more information about their opponents than did 
individuals who concentrated on forming a definite unilateral strategy. 
If increased information has the effect hypothesized in the previous 
section, informational differences could account for Druckman's results 
(instead of strategy versus no strategy). 
However, the difference between the Bass and Druckman studies are 
still not explained by this. Bass did offer one possible reason. He 
stated that the complex outcomes within his own study, call for 
simplifying required negotiations (p, 2l)," For example, he had subjects 
arrive at agreements on nine issues while Druckman used only four. 
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The present study greatly reduced the complexity of the negotiations 
and also controlled for informational input into the bargaining. The 
effect of strategy versus no strategy on such bargaining behaviors as the 
setting of the GL and GL alt was put to the test. 
Group versus individual Since mixed-motive situations are so 
prevalent, individuals faced with them are predictably aware of one 
universal fact: the best possible solution to the conflict from one's own 
point of view is probably not the best solution for one's opponent. As 
Kelley (1966) states, a person is typically aware that contracts acceptable 
to an opponent usually lie between one's own best payoff and GL alt. 
Also, the more in terms of payoff one demands from a contract, the greater 
the danger of bringing one's opponent's payoff below the opponents GL alt 
(at which time the opponent would withdraw from the bargaining). 
Thus a bargainer has a choice of taking a safe bargaining position 
and accepting a possibly inferior contract, or being more demanding and 
risking the possibility of no contract at all. Evidence has already been 
given that lack of information about an opponent, and also the act of 
forming a strategy before bargaining, can lead to a more adamant, demanding 
and risky bargaining stance. There is a growing body of data which 
suggests that group versus individual prenegotiation activity might also 
affect the risk-taking propensity of a bargainer. 
A rather consistent result of studies on rtsk is that groups are 
riskier than one would expect from the average risk-propensity of the 
group members (Wallach, Kogan, and Bern, 19^2; Marquis, 1962; Bern, Wallach, 
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and Kogan, 1965),^ Also the individuals, when measured indiviiually after 
the group experience, are riskier than they were "before the group 
experience. There are various explanations for this effect such as 
diffusion of responsibility, the realization of some cultural value toward 
risky behavior, and the possible leadership status given to risky people. 
Whatever the explanation, one might predict that if individuals discuss 
a bargaining situation (during a prenegotiation discussion or strategy 
session) in a group, they will subsequently be riskier bargainers than 
those individuals who prepare for a bargaining session alone. The 
Increased riskiness should be manifested by higher initial bids, reluctance 
to make concessions, and generally more adamant bargaining behavior. 
Bass (1966) compared group versus individual preparation and found 
that the former produced longer bargaining times and more deadlocks 
(especially when combined with strategy formation). It remained to be 
seen whether this effect would be obtained when the other prenegotiation 
activities and the amount of Information available to the group are held 
constant. Worthy of mention in this regard is a stid.y by Harnett, 
Gummings, and Hughes (1968), who found that risk-taking propensity of 
bargainers Increased as the amount of information available to the 
bargainers decreased. 
^"Riskiness" is generally defined as the tendency to choose 
behaviors which may lead to potentially larger payoffs or rewards, but 
which have lower probability of success. The Increase in riskiness due 
to group experience is called the "risky shift" phenomenon, and will 
be referred to as such throughout the paper. 
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The Mixed-Motive Game 
It is difficult to discuss mixed-motive situations purely in the 
abstract; especially when deriving testable hypotheses. Therefore, before 
any hypotheses are stated, it seems appropriate to discuss the particular 
mixed-motive situation which was used in this study. The situation was 
a buyer-seller game adapted from Slegel and Fouraker (196O), In this 
game there are behavioral choices for both participants in a dyad. For 
the seller these choices are in terms of how much (quantity) of a commodity 
he would like to sell and what price he would like to charge for each item. 
The buyer must also sake price-quantity choices. For each price-quantity 
relationship there is a set payoff for both the buyer and the seller 
(usually different, however). The task of the bargainers is to arrive at 
a price-quantity contract which is acceptable to both of them. 
It is a characteristic of the price-quantity matrices that, in general, 
the higher profit the buyer gets the lower the seller gets, and vice versa. 
However, there is also a set of price-quantity values for which the total 
payoff to the two participants is at a maximum. Therefore the bargainers 
are faced with the dilemma of either maximizing the total joint payoff 
(and thus providing their opponents with high, satisfactory payoffs) or 
of maximizing their own payoffs (at the expense of their opponents, of 
course). Hence it is a mixed-motive situation. 
There was also some modification of the original Slegel and Fouraker 
game. First of all, in keeping with the tenets of Thibaut and Kelley's 
(1959) model of dyadic interaction each bargainer was provided with a 
monetary alternative to participation. Second, if either bargainer 
became unhappy with the dyad, he could withdraw thus reducing the payoffs 
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of both participants to their alternatives. Third, the bargaining was 
done under time constraints. If the contracts were not reached within a 
certain time limit, the bargainers were forced to accept the alternatives. 
Finally, in the Siegel and Fouraker (1960) studies, either the bargainers 
knew their own and their opponents' matrices, or only their own matrices. 
In the present study either each bargainer knew his own payoff natrix and 
alternative plus his opponent's payoff matrix (high-information condition), 
or each knew only his own payoff matrix and alternative (low-information 
condition). Bargainers never knew their opponents' alternatives. 
These changes were made for two reasons. First, the modified Siegel 
and Fouraker game was more realistic because it eliminated the complete 
information condition (a very rare condition in reality), and also because 
it included alternatives and time limits. Second, the game, as presently 
modified fit well into the Thibaut and Kelley (1959) model and allowed 
tests of several predictions arising from that model. 
Hypotheses 
Information 
The major question in regard to this variable concerned how different 
amounts of mutual information affect bargaining behavior and bargaining 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1. Bargainers in the low-information condition will 
initially set higher GL's than bargainers in the high-information condition. 
The rationale for this hypothesis is based on two competing tendencies. 
First, exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) predicts that individuals 
attempt to maximize their payoffs in any dyadic relationship. Second, it 
is also predicted that the individuals will try to avoid competing 
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behavioral sets (combinations of behaviors which drop one of the 
bargainers below his GL alt, thus terminating the relationship). These 
two tendencies conflict with one another. The higher the payoff one 
attempts to achieve, the more one risks the possibility of forcing one's 
opponent to withdraw. On the other hand, by trying to satisfy an 
opponent, one might be forced to accept an inferior payoff. It is 
hypothesized that the solution to this dilemma will result in different 
GL's for the two information conditions. 
In the high-information condition, the bargainers know one anothers 
payoffs; and therefore, to avoid alienating their opponents, bargainers 
will choose GL's which provide a maximum, although equal, payoff to one 
another. In reference to the game matrices (see Appendix A) bargainers 
will choose a GL close to $2.70 or a quantity of nine and a price of $ .75. 
In the low-information condition, each bargainer knows only his own 
price-quantity matrix. Thus the buyer knows that he has a possible range 
of payoffs from $1.00 (the assigned alternative) to $15.30» The range for 
the seller is from $1.00 to $7.20. Again, the bargainers will try to 
avoid forcing their opponents below the GL alt's while at the same time 
maximizing their own payoffs. However, the bargainers have some idea of 
their own possible payoffs, but no idea of what price-quantity bids 
would be acceptable to their opponents. Thus In choosing their GL's, it 
would seem that participants would pick values somewhere near the mid­
point between the maximum possible payoff and the alternative. For the 
buyer, thin would bo a profit of about $8,25, and for the seller a profit 
of about $4.60. This prediction is based on a statement by Thibaut and 
Kelley (1959) concerning this type of situation, "The GL thus begins to 
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approximate the modal value of the range of outcomes over which the 
person believes his control prevails (p, 86)," In any event, rather than 
choosing exact GL values, the author was content with predicting a higher 
initial CL in the low-information condition than in the high-information 
condition. 
Hypothesis 2, Bargainers will set their GL alt's above the actual 
$1,00 alternative provided. Also the GL alt's will be set higher in the 
low-information condition than in the high-information condition. This 
prediction evolves from Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) discussion of how the 
CL alt is established. They state that the GL alt is set, in part, by 
comparison of one's own payoff levels with the levels for individuals in 
other similar situations. Of course, one obvious individual who could be 
used for comparison, is one's own opponent. It is predicted that a person 
will set his GL alt higher, the higher the perceived payoff of one's 
opponent. Using arguments similar to those for Hypothesis 1, it can be 
reasoned that a player will perceive his opponent's payoffs for various 
contracts to be higher in the low-information condition; and thus the CL 
alts will also be higher in the low-information condition, 
A corollary of the above hypothesis can be stated as follows: there 
will be more bargaining deadlocks in the low-information condition. 
Because the GL alt's will be higher in this condition, there will be a 
greater possibility of payoffs falling below the CL alts and greater 
possibility that one of the bargainers will withdraw. 
Hypothesis 2» Bargainers in the high-information condition will 
reach agreements faster than bargainers in the low-information condition. 
Information provided In the high-information condition is crucial for 
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mutually satisfactory agreements. Low-information bargainers must 
explore the matrix of outcomes and acquire the necessary information 
before adequate solutions can be reached. According to Kelley (1966), 
the need for Information is also complicated by the fact that the 
information must come from an opponent whose veracity is open to doubt. 
This need for information compounded by the dilemma of whether to believe 
the Information when it is provided, will cause bargaining times to be 
significantly greater in the low-information condition. 
Hypothesis 4# Low-information condition bargainers will make 
more attempts at misrepresenting their payoffs and alternatives than will 
high-information bargainers, Kelley (1966) hypothesized that bargainers 
with incomplete information about their opponents will be tempted to 
misrepresent their bargaining positions while attempting to gather 
information about their opponents. In this way, if the deception is 
successful, bargainers can maximize their own payoffs while providing 
minimally acceptable payoffs to their opponents. In this study, the 
hypothesis will be tested that the less mutual information bargainers have 
about one another, the more they will be tempted to deceive one another. 
Hypothesis Bargainers In the low-information condition will 
express less satisfaction with regard to the interactions and payoffs 
than bargainers In the high-Information condition. Because the CL's will 
be set higher in the low-Information condition, there will be a greater 
tendency for the final agreements to be l>elow the GL's, Thus bargainers 
will express less satisfaction for the payoffs in the low-information 
condition. This prediction I3 interesting because it is the opposite of 
what one would predict using a cognitive dissonance approach (Festlnger, 
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195?)• If agreements in the low-information condition take longer and are 
more difficult to attain, cognitive dissonance theories would predict 
that the payoffs from these situations would be more, Instead of less, 
satisfying. 
Hypothesis 6, Bargainers in the high-information condition will 
receive a higher joint payoff than bargainers in the low-Information 
condition. The maximum joint payoff occurs at a quantity agreement of 
nine. Any deviations from this value reduces the joint payoff, and in 
general the larger the deviations the lower the joint payoff ; also, 
deviations from the optimum mutual price-quantity relationship. Since it 
has already been hypothesized that low-information bargainers will choose 
higher GL*s (higher individual payoff expectations) than high-information 
bargainers, it follows that the low-information condition contracts will 
deviate further from the joint mutual maximum payoff than high-information 
condition contracts. 
Group versus individual prenegotiation activity 
Research on the risky shift phenomenon has produced results which 
are relevant to the issue of bargaining. The main question concerns 
whether group prenegotiation experience leads to riskier individual 
bargaining behavior than does individual prenegotiation experience. Using 
Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) exchange theory terminology, does prenegotia­
tion activity have an effect on the setting of the CL's and GL alt's? 
Hypothesis Bargainers who prepare for the negotiations in 
groups will Initially set higher CL's and CL alt's than bargainers who 
prepare alone. Bargainers in any mixed-motive situation have information 
needs which must be satisfied In order for maximum payoffs to be won. But 
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in the Initial stages of any interaction, individuals must decide what 
responses to make without the benefit of the needed information. The 
uncertainty which individuals experience in these situations, besides 
being detrimental to maximum payoffs, is also uncomfortable according to 
Jones and Gerard (1967). These authors believe that in such ambiguous 
situations, people seek unambiguous solutions; and thus, individuals press 
toward unequivocal behavior orientations or UBO. 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) state, "subjects tend to expect to do 
about as well as others similar to themselves ,.« (p. 83)." In the 
present context, group discussion should provide the social comparison 
necessary to establish the UBO (unequivocal behavior orientation) which 
the group members seek. In addition the risky shift data predicts that the 
UBO the group decides upon will be riskier than could have been predicted 
from the average riskiness of the group members. 
The probable effects of the group discussion on individual members' 
U3G*s, GL's, CL alt's and riskiness lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8, Bargainers who prepare for the negotiations in 
groups will take longer to reach an agreement. 
Hypothesis 9, Bargainers who prepare for the negotiations in 
groups will reach contracts yielding lower joint payoffs than bargainers 
who prepare alone. 
Hypothesis 10. Bargainers who prepare for the negotiations in 
groups will be less satisfied with the bargaining interactions and 
outcomes than bargainers who prepare alone. The former will also be 
involved in more deadlocks. 
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Strategy versus no strategy 
It is difficult to predict what effect, if any, strategy formation 
will have on the setting of the GL's and GL alt's. However, the 
Druckman (1967, I968) and Bass (1966) research Indicates that strategy 
formation does have some of the same effects on bargaining behavior and 
outcomes as does the raising of the GL's and GL alt's by various means. 
For instance, strategy formation seems to lead to longer bargaining times 
and more deadlocks. Thus it will be hypothesized in this study that; 
Hypothesis 11, Bargainers who form a definite strategy before 
entering the negotiations will take longer to reach an agreement and will 
be involved in more bargaining deadlocks than bargainers who do not form 
definite strategies. It is possible that strategy formation leads to a 
UBO, and the UBO leads to a more adamant bargaining stance. In any event, 
this hypothesis will be tested without the confounding of the information 
variable as existed in the Druckman (1967, I968) and Bass (1966) studies. 
Interaction 
As Siegel and Fouraker (I960) state, "an increase of information 
available to subjects would probably make it considerably more difficult 
to influence the subjects 'level of aspiration* (p. 87)." Thus, it is 
probable that the more mutual information bargainers have, the less 
influence such variables as group preparation and strategy formation have 
on the setting of the GL's and GL alt's. 
Hypothesis 12, Group prenegotiation activity and strategy 
formation will have less deleterious effects on bargaining behavior and 
outcomes in the high-Information condition than in the low-information 
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condition. As a result, in the high-information condition GL's and CL 
alt's will be lower, there will be faster agreements and fewer deadlocks, 
and the bargainers will be more satisfied with the results than in the 
low-information condition, regardless of any prenegotiation effects. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of l44 male volunteer Ss from introductory psychology classes 
at Iowa State University participated in the experiment. The Ss were 
randomly assigned to the sixteen experimental conditions. As already 
mentioned, Incentive for participation consisted of money the bargainers 
could win in the course of bargaining. The amount of money depended on 
each subject's performance on the experimental task. 
It should be noted in passing that Druckman (196?) found Dogmatism 
Scale scores related to bargaining behavior, and recommended pre-selecting 
subjects according to this variable. However, Druckman used a modified 
scale loaded with new items related to his particular bargaining task. 
Since it is reasonable to suspect that his results were due to his 
modification of the scale, the subjects in this study were randomly 
assigned to treatments rather than matched on any personality variable. 
The Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, I960) was administered post-experimentally 
to see if random selection were actually obtained. 
Design 
The experimental design was a 2^ factorial, analysis of variance. 
Group versus individual, strategy versus no-strategy, low-information 
versus high-information, and buyer versus seller conditions produced a 
total of sixteen treatment conditions. Nine Ss were randomly assigned to 
each of these sixteen conditions, 
for the bargaining interaction, nine buyers and nine sellers were 
randomly paired to form nine dyads in eight treatment conditions. For 
throe of the dependent variables (time to resolution, number of deadlocks, 
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and value of the joint payoff) the dyad was the unit of analysis, of 
course I "because these values were the same for the buyer and seller in any 
dyad (hence a 2^ factorial). For all the other dependent variables, the 
individual was the unit of analysis (2^ factorial). 
Procedure 
For the conditions involving groups, 6 Ss at a time reported to the 
experiment. Three of the 6 Ss were assigned a "buyer's" role and 3 a 
"seller's" role. The 3 Ss who assumed the same role (that is, the three 
buyers or three sellers) met together and, after reading the instructions 
and asking questions, discussed the bargaining situation for five minutes. 
After the group discussions, the two groups of 3 Ss were randomly paired 
into 3 dyads. The dyads then bargained without future interaction with 
the groups. Three sets of 3 such dyads constituted the 9 dyads in a group 
condition. 
For the conditions involving individual prenegotiation activity, 6 
Ss also reported at the same time. The Ss were given instructions and 
asked to study the bargaining situation alone. The 6 Ss were then paired 
Into 3 bargaining dyads. 
After the 5 minute discussion in the group conditions or 5 minute 
study in the Individual condition, half the groups and half the Individuals 
were asked to form a strategy (in anyone dyad, both Ss received the same 
treatments). The strategy consisted of the Ss deciding upon their first 
and second bids, their expectancy in terms of payoff, the lowest profit 
they would accept, the level of payoff they expected their opponents to 
achieve, their estimate of the bargaining time, and their decision about 
whether or not they would deceive their opponents (see Appendix C for the 
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strategy questionnaire). The Ss were given 5 additional minutes to decide 
the strategy and write it down. To determine whether this manipulation 
was successful, the Ss were asked in the post-experimental questionnaire 
(see Appendix D) whether they did or did not form a strategy. 
Thus there were group strategy, group no-strategy, individual-
strategy, and individual no-strategy conditions. Within each of these 
four conditions, half the bargainers had no Infor nation about one another, 
and half had partial information in terms of one another's payoffs for 
various agreements. 
The instructions for the various conditions appear in Appendix B. 
Table 1 enumerates the different treatments. 
The bargaining dyads were given 30 minutes to reach a solution. At 
the conclusion of the bargaining, all participants filled out a post-
negotiation questionnaire, a semantic differential, and a Dogmatism Scale 
(see Appendices D, E, and F respectively). The semantic differential was 
used to measure the attitudes of bargainers toward their bargaining dyad. 
Task 
The bargaining task was a buyer-seller game. In this gams, one person 
took the role of a seller and the other a buyer. Each participant was 
given a matrix of values (see Appendix A). On the top row of the matrix 
was listed quantities of a product that could be sold (l to 18). Along 
the left margin of the matrix was listed the possible prices for one item 
of the product (5c to $1,20), The body of the matrix contained the profit 
margin one could receive for the various price-quantity relations. There 
were different matrices for the buyer and seller. 
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Table 1. Experimental conditions 
1 Group - No information - Strategy - Buyer - n - 9 
2 Group - No information - Strategy - Seller - n « 9 
3 Group - No information - No strategy - Buyer - n - 9 
4 Group - No information - No strategy - Seller - n « 9 
5 Group - Information - Strategy - Buyer - n • 9 
6 Group - Information - Strategy - Seller - n » 9 
7 Group - Information - No strategy - Buyer - n - 9 
8 Group - Information - No strategy - Seller - n • 9 
9 Individual - No information - Strategy - Buyer - n - 9 
10 Individual - No information - Strategy - Seller - n - 9 
11 Individual - No information - No strategy - Buyer - n » 9 
12 Individual - No information - No strategy - Seller - n - 9 
13 Individual - Information - Strategy - Buyer - n - 9 
14 Individual - Information - Strategy - Seller - n - 9 
15 Individual - Information - No strategy - Buyer - n = 9 
16 Individual - Information - No strategy - Seller - n - 9 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
9 dyads 
The game was slightly different from its original form in that each 
S was assigned a GL alt of $1,00 (a payoff he would get even if no 
agreement was reached). Each S was given the same GL alt, although the 
Ss were not aware that they were the same. 
In each dyad, the buyer was told to make the first bid in terms of a 
price-quantity relationship. Besides the price-quantity bid, the 
bargainer could also state the profit he would be making for a certain bid. 
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and the alternatives he had (the bargainer did not have to be honest about 
his profit or alternatives; but the price-quantity bid, once given, could 
not be withdrawn). The seller either accepted the bid or returned an alter­
native bid. The exchange of bids continued until someone accepted a con­
tract or withdrew from the negotiations, or until the 30 minute deadline 
occurred. The bids were given verbally. The Ss, however, were seated on 
opposite sides of a screen so that the opponents could not see one another. 
Before the Initial bid, and after each succeeding set of eight exchanged 
bids (four for each bargainer), each S was asked to write down what he 
thought he would win in the game and what was the minimum payoff he would 
accept for an agreement. At the same time, the Ss were asked to estimate 
what values their opponents chose for the above two variables. This 
information designated the Ss' GL's and GL alt's and their estimates of 
their opponents GL's and GL alt's before the game began and as the game 
progressed. 
The Ss were also required to write down their bids as they gave them, 
anc their opponents' bids as they received them. Along with the price and 
quantity of the bid, the Ss wrote down profits and alternatives if they 
volunteered that information or received that information from their 
opponents. The Ss were awarded the money indicated by the price-quantity 
agreement they reached. If no agreement was reached, they received the 
$1.00 alternative. 
For the Ss In the low-information condition, only their own price-
quantity matrix values were known, Ss In the high-Information condition 
had both the buyer and seller price-quantity matrices. In no case did a 
bargainor know his opponent's GL alt. 
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RESULTS 
The source tatles and cell means for all fifteen analyses of variance 
can be seen in Appendix G. Table 2 contains the results of the significance 
tests for all the hypothesized effects. Significant findings concerning 
effects about which no hypotheses were made appear in Table 3» In addition 
to the analyses of variance, all the dependent variables were inter-
correlated, The correlation matrix appears in Appendix H, 
The data have been organized in the following manner. To be discussed 
first will be a phase of the bargaining called the "bargaining stance," 
Included in this phase are the following four dependent variables» the 
bargainers* initial CL's, the initial CL alt's, and the estimates of the 
opponents' CL's and CL alt's. The second phase of the bargaining consists 
of the actual "bargaining behavior." Dependent variables relating to this 
phase are the following; the level of the first bid, the bargaining times, 
the number of bids exchanged, the number of deceptions, and the final 
CL's and CL alt's. "Bargaining outcomes" constitutes the third and final 
phase of the analysis. Relevant variables here include the individuals' 
payoffs, the total payoffs, the payoff minus final GL differences, ratings 
of satisfaction, and the number of bargaining deadlocks. 
Bargaining Stance 
Initial GL and GL alt 
2 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that low-information bargainers would 
have initially higher CL and CL alts (respectively) than high-information 
bargainers. The prediction was supported for the CL, but not the CL alt. 
^The numbering of the hypotheses In the Introduction is maintained. 
Table 2, Significance tests for the hypothesized main effects 
Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
A Low-Information 
VS. 
Hi&h-Tnfnrma.tlon. 
B Strategy 
VS. 
No-Strategy 
C Group 
VS. 
Individual 
D Buyer 
VS. 
Seller 
Interaction 
Bargaining 
Stance 
Initial CL .01 N.3. .01 AXD 
Initial GL alt N . S c '  N.S. 
(3) Opponent GL 
X"^) Opponent CL alt 
AXD 
Bargaining 
Behavior 
First Bid AXD V.) 
o 
Time .01 N.S. N.S. 
,3) Number of Bids 
,^) Deceptions 
AX G 
.01 
.5) Final CL 
[T) Final CL alt 
AXD 
AXD 
Bargaining 
Outcomes 
TÏT Ind. Payoff 
Joint Payoff 
.10 .05 AXD 
Pay off-Pinal CI 
Satisfaction 
(5) Deadlocks N.S. N.S. 
^N.3, = non-significance. 
Table J. Significant effects about which no hypotheses were made 
Independent Variables 
Dependent A Low. -Inforiration B Strategy C Group D Buyer Interactions 
Variables VS. VS. VS. VS. 
High--Inf ormation No-Strategy Individual Seller 
Bargaining 
Stance 
(1) Initial CL 
(2) Initial GL alt AXBXGXD 
(3) Cpponent GL .01 
('+) Cpponent GL alt 
Bargaining Behavior 
(Ij First Bid .01 .01 .01 
(2 j Time 
{ 3 )  Number of Bids .01 .05 
(•^) deceptions .05a 
(5) Final GL .05 .01 AXBXCXD 
(6) Pinal CL alt AXBXCXD 
bargaining 
Outcomes 
(1) Ind, Payoff .01 
(2) Joint Payoff 
(3) Payoff-Final CL AXGXD 
4) Satisfaction 
5; Deadlocks 
^This significant effect was obtained, for the number of persons who attempted deceptions, and not 
the number of deceptions made. 
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The mean CL for the low-Information bargainers was $3,84; for the high-
information bargainers, the mean C.t was $3,01 (F » 15#^, d,f, l/l28, 
p < .01), For the means associated with the hypothesized effects and 
non-hypothesized significant effects for the four dependent variables 
included under bargaining stance, consult Table 4, 
Hypothesis 1 also predicted that buyers would set initially higher 
GL's than sellers. The cell means for the buyers and sellers of $3.73 
and $3,11 respectively proved to be significantly different at the .01 
level (F - 8.50, d.f. l/l28). 
It was also predicted that bargainers who prepared for negotiations 
in groups would set initially higher CL's and GL alt's than bargainers who 
prepared alone (Hypothesis ?»)* Table 4 indicates very little difference 
in the cell means due to group versus individual preparation. Hypothesis 
7 was thus not confirmed. 
Finally, Hypothesis 12 predicted that any effect on the setting of 
the CL's or CL alt's due to either strategy versus no-strategy, or group 
versus individual preparation, or the assumption of the buyer-seller role, 
in the low-information condition, would be reduced in the high-information 
condition. Since, in general, the buyers had higher CL's than the sellers, 
Hypothesis 12 would predict that the difference would be greater in the 
low-information than in the high-information conditions (as indicated by 
a significant information by bargaining role interaction). Such an inter­
action was found (F = 5«21, d.f. l/l28, p .05). The information X buyer-
seller interaction was the only interaction associated with the initial 
CL. The means for all the significant two-way interactions involving 
information appear in Table $. 
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Table 4, Means associated with hypothesized and/or significant main 
effects in the bargaining stance phase 
Low 
Information 
High 
Information Group Ind, Buyer Seller 
Initial GL $3,84** 3.01 3.44 3.41 3.73** 3.11 
Initial GL alt 2.06 1.99 2.09 1.94 
Opponents GL 3.80** 2.93 
Opponents GL alt 
Note: Table is to be read as follows: e.g., $3.84 is significantly 
higher than $3«01, confirming a significant main effect due to level of 
information on the initial GL value. **p < .01, 
An unexpected four-way interaction was significant for the GL alt 
variable that is, an information x strategy x preparation x role inter­
action, (K - 5.44, d.f. 1/128, p <,05). 
Opponent GL and GL alt 
No hypotheses were made about the estimates of the opponents' initial 
GL's and GL alt's. For the opponents' GL's, however, an information main 
effect Has found (F » 9:07; d:f. l/l28. p < .01), For the appropriate 
means, see Table 4, 
A significant interaction also appeared between the information and 
buyer-seller conditions (F - 6,64, d.f, l/l28, pd .05). 
Bargaining Behavior 
First bid 
No specific hypothesis was made concerning the level of the first bid. 
However, based on past research and theory, an information and buyer-
seller main effect could easily have been predicted. The data indicate 
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Table 5» Means for the significant two-way Information-related, 
interactions for all the dependent variables 
Low-Information HiRh-I nf ormati on 
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller 
Initial CL $4.39 $3.28 $3.07 $2.93 
Opponent CL $4.23 $3.36 $2.61 $3.23 
First Bid $9.99 $5.51 $6.15 $3.93 
Final CL $3.06 $2.08 $2.80 $2.79 
Final CL alt $2.33 $1.57 $1.86 $2.16 
Ind, Payoff $2.71 $2.19 $2.63 $2.62 
Satisfaction 55.8 62.0 61.2 60.7 
Group Individual Group Individual 
Number of Bids 38.1 26.2 11.7 11.5 
that low-information bargainers made significantly higher Initial bids than 
did high-information bargainers; also buyers started with higher bids than 
sellers (for the two analyses respectively, F - 32*0, d,f: 1/Ï28, p =01, 
and F =• ^,2, d,f, l/l28, p <^,01), Table 6 contains the relevant means 
for hypothesized effects and non-hypothesized significant effects for this 
phase of the bargaining. 
An unpredicted and unexpected result, however, was that subjects who 
formed a strategy before bargaining made significantly higher initial 
bids than subjects who do not form a strategy (F - 9»^» d^f, 1/128, 
p <l»Ol), This was one of the few dependent variables that was affected 
by strategy formation. 
Table 6. Means associated with hypothesized and/or significant main effects in the bargaining 
behavior phase 
Fi rst Bid 
Time 
Number of Bids 
Deceptions 
Final CL 
Final GL alt 
Low High No 
Information Information Strategy Strategy Group Ind, Buyer Seller 
$7.75** $5.04 $7.13** $5.66 $8.07** $4.72 
17.2** 7.5 11.4 9.6 10.4 10.3 
32.2** 11.6 24.9* 18.9 
1.04** .14 
$2.57* $2.80 $2.93** $2.^44 
V-r\ 
**P oOl. 
*p .05. 
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The expected information x buyer-seller interaction was found in the 
analysis of the first bids (for appropriate means, see Table 9)» However, 
the interaction did not result between information and strategy versus 
no-strategy. The mean first bid for the strategy and no-strategy 
conditions in the low-information situation were $8,46 and $7,04 
respectively. In the high-information situation, the strategy and no-
strategy condition means were $5,80 and $4.28 respectively. Thus increased 
information reduced the level of the first bid for the strategy and no-
strategy bargainers, but did not reduce the difference between them. Hence, 
Hypothesis 12 (concerning interactions) was not supported in this instance. 
Time and number of bids 
It was hypothesized that low versus high-information, strategy versus 
no-strategy, and group versus individual preparation would all have an 
effect on bargaining times (Hypotheses 3, 8, and 11 respectively). 
Actually, only the information variable produced a significant main effect, 
with low-information bargainers taking longer to reach agreements than 
high-Information bargainers (F - 24,8, d,f, l/64, p <L.Ol). As Table 6 
3 indicates, low-information bargainers took an average of 17.2^ minutes to 
reach an agreement, while the average for high-information bargainers was 
7.5 minutes. 
The total number of bids was analyzed as a second measure of 
bargaining duration. Again an information main effect was obtained (F - 56,2, 
d.f, l/64, p .01 ), Surprisingly, there was also an effect due to the 
group versus individual preparation variable (F - 4.84, d.f. 1/64, p<^ .05). 
3 
For the actual analysis, the reciprocal of time was used. 
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Apparently, time and number of bids represent different aspects of 
bargaining diuration. In fact, a correlation of only .60 was obtained 
between those two variables. The group preparation bargainers exchanged 
bids at a faster rate and thus they exchanged more bids while taking the 
same amount of time to reach agreements as the individually prepared 
bargainers. 
Finally, the expected interaction between information and group versus 
individual preparation was found with regard to the number of bids 
(F - 4,$8, d.f. l/64, p < .05; see Table 5 for the means). 
Deceptions 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that low-information bargainers would attempt 
to deceive their opponents more often than high-information bargainers. 
This hypothesis was supported at the ,01 level of significance (F - 11,5^, 
d.f l/l28). Low-information bargainers attempted an average oT 1.04^ 
deceptions; for high-information bargainers, the average was .14 deceptions. 
Although there were no other effects with regard to the number of 
deceptions, it was found that the number of bargainers who deceived their 
opponents was significantly greater in the strategy condition than in the 
no-strategy condition (respectively 21 out of 72 bargainers versus 10 out 
of 72, X - 15.61, p <.0l). 
Final GL and GL alt 
No hypotheses were made with regard to the final CL's and GL alt's. 
It was found, however, that the information and the buyer-seller variables 
For the actual analysis, the transform yl + number of deceptions 
was used. 
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again had significant effects on the setting of the final CL's* Low-
information bargainers actually set their final CL's lower than did 
high-information bargainers (F « 4,20, d.f, l/l28, p ,05; see Table 6), 
Therefore, low-information bargainers began with significantly higher GL's 
and ended with significantly lower GL's than high-information bargainers. 
It was also found that buyers had significantly higher final GL's 
than sellers (F - 20,9, d,f, l/l28, p-si. ,01), 
There were no main effects for the final CL alt. 
For both the final CL and final GL alt there occurred the usual 
Information x buyer-seller interaction (respectively F • 2,04, d,f, l/l28, 
p <_,01, and F - l6,8, d,f, l/l28, p ,01; see Table 5 for the relevant 
means), 
Finally, analyses of both the final CL and GL alt produced the same 
four-way interaction as was found with the initial GL alt (respectively 
F - 7,17, d,f. 1/128, p c ,01, and F - 7.95, d.f, l/l28, p -C ,0l). 
Bargaining Outcomes 
Individual and .joint payoff 
It was predicted that information and group versus individual 
preparation would have significant effects on the valuer» of the joint 
payoffs (Hypotheses 6 and 9)« As predicted, group preparation bargainers 
received a significantly lower joint payoff than did individual 
preparation bargainers (F - 6,01, d,f. l/64, p d,05). The average payoff 
for the group condition was $4.83, and for the individual condition, $5.32 
(the means associated with the hypothesized and/or significant main effects 
for this phase of the bargaining appear in Table 7). The difference in 
average payoff for the low and high information bargainers approached 
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significance (F - 3*1^» d.f. l/64, p ,10); and the difference was in 
the predicted direction (low-information bargainers received a lower 
joint payoff). 
Not surprisingly, the same result was obtained with the individual 
payoff as with the joint payoff. That is, group-preparation bargainers 
received a lower joint payoff than individual-preparation bargainers 
(F - 5t72, d.f, 1/128, p-i-,05), and low-information bargainers received 
a lower individual payoff than high-information bargainers (F - 3.01, 
d.f. 1/128, p ^  .10). 
With the individual payoff variable, the information x buyer-seller 
interaction again occurred (F • 6.92, d.f. l/l28, p-£l .01; conslut Table 5 
for the relevant means). 
Final GL minus payoff difference and satisfaction 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) predict that a relationship exists between 
the distance a person's actual payoff is from his expected payoff and that 
person's satisfaction with the interaction. That is, the greater the 
distance between a person's GL and payoff, the lower will be his 
satisfaction. Hypotheses 5 and 10 predicted that the payoff minus final 
GL differences would be greater in the low-information condition than in 
the high-information condition, and greater in the group preparation 
condition than in the Individual preparation condition. Hence, it was 
also hypothesized that low-information bargainers would express less 
satisfaction with the Interaction than would high-information bargainers; 
and group condition subjects would be less satisfied than those in the 
Individual condition (satisfaction was measured by a Semantic Differential, 
see Appendix S). Actually, the payoff-final GL difference was not 
Table ?. Means associated vrlth hypothesized and/or significant main effects in the bargaining 
outcome phase 
Low 
Information 
High 
Information 
No 
Strategy Strategy Group Ind. Buyer Seller 
Ind. Payoff $2.45* $2.62 $2.42** $2.66 $2.66*^ ^ $2.40 
Joint Payoff $4.89* $5.25 $4,83** $5.32 
Payoff-Final CL -$0.12 -$0.16 -$0.24 . -$0.04 
Satisfaction 58.9 61.0 59.0 60.8 
••p c .05. 
*p c .10. 
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differentially affected by either the information level or the type of 
preparation. Therefore, information and preparation should not have 
differentially affected satisfaction either. In fact, this was what was 
found. 
There was found a significant three-way interaction with regard to 
the payoff-final GL difference (information x group-individual x buyer-
seller; F - 4.95, d.f. 1/128, p .05). Group preparation buyers who 
bargained in the low-information condition produced a payoff minus final 
GL difference of -$0,78, This difference was over three times laiger than 
any of the other means concerned with the interaction, 
A significant interaction was also found for the satisfaction variable. 
The familiar information x buyer-seller interaction again occurred (F - 4,35i 
d.f, 1/128, p<.,05). As Table 5 indicates, buyers in the low-information 
condition actually were less satisfied than sellers. In the high-
information condition the difference disappears. A corresponding finding 
was that the buyers payoff-final GL difference was relatively large in the 
low-information condition (-$0,34 versus $0,10 for the sellers). The 
Information x buyer-seller interaction approached significance ( F - j.ol, 
d.f, 1/128, p<l.lO), In this one instance then, satisfaction was related 
to the payoff-final GL difference. 
Deadlocks and wj.thdrawals 
Hypotheses 2, 10, and 11 predicted that there would be more deadlocks 
and/or bargaining withdrawals in the low-information condition, in the 
strategy condition, and in the group preparation condition, than in their 
counterparts respectively. Actually there occurred only four deadlocks 
and one withdrawal; the deadlocks occurred in the low-information condition 
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and the withdrawal in the high-information condition. The two types of 
"bargaining "break-downs" were analyzed together^; no main effect due 
to information or strategy was found. However all the "bargaining break­
downs did occur in group conditions. An analysis of the dichotomous data 
(break-down versus no break-down), indicated that group preparation 
bargainers were involved in a significantly greater number of negotiation 
break-downs than individual preparation bargainers (F = 5«55? d.f, l/35» 
p c .05), 
Relationships Between Dependent Variables 
Appendix H contains the intercorrelation matrix for all the dependent 
variables. As can be seen, the initial CL and CL alt, the final CL and 
GL alt, the estimates of opponents initial CL and CL alt, the level of 
the first bid, and the payoff-final GL difference were all significantly 
intercorrelated with one another. All these variables were related to the 
subjects' expectations of bargaining payoffs. Therefore, the prediction 
from Hypothesis 2, that the initial CL alt would be related to the 
estimates of the opponents CL was supported (r - .44, p ,01), 
In terms of bargaining duration. It was found that initial CL and 
opponents' GL, and level of the first bid were positively related to 
bargaining time and the number of bids. Also, time and number of bids 
were significantly correlated (.60) but they did not correlate completely 
the same with the remaining dependent variables. For instance, the number 
of bids was negatively correlated with the size of the individual payoff 
while time was not. 
^See Winer (i960) on analysis of dichotomous data, p. 138, 
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Although the results of the analysis of variance of the satisfaction 
data did not indicate any main effects due to the independent variables, 
satisfaction was negatively related to bargaining duration. 
Finally, it was found that the number of deceptions was positively 
correlated with bargaining duration. 
Dogmatism Scale 
An analysis of variance of thg Dogmatism Scale scores was performed 
to test whether random selection ha.s been accomplished for this variable. 
None of the effects even approached significance, supporting random 
selection. 
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DISCUSSION 
Low-Information Versus High-Information Bargaining 
Summary' of results 
Low-information bargainers exhibited substantially different 
bargaining behavior than did high-information bargainers. The former had 
higher initial expectancies (CL's) and estimated their opponent's CL's 
as being higher; however, they ended the bargaining with significantly 
lower expectations. Low-Information bargainers took a longer time and a 
larger number of bids to reach an agreement; in the course of the 
bargaining, they attempted more deceptions. Finally, low-information 
bargainers won lower joint and Individual payoffs than high-information 
bargainers. 
In contrast, different levels of information had no differential 
effects on the settings of the initial CL alt, opponent's GL alt, and 
final CL alt. In addition, the information variable had no main effect on 
the number of deadlocks, the payoff-final CL difference, nor the satis­
faction ratings. 
The hypothesized interaction between information and the other 
independent variables was found in several cases. First of all, each time 
the buyer-seller variable had a main effect, it was also found to interact 
with information. An information x group versus individual preparation 
Interaction was also found with regard to number of bids (for which a 
group-individual main effect was found). However, increased information 
did not ameliorate the effect of slralegy formation on the level of the 
first bid and the number of people attempting deceptions, or the effect of 
group preparation on the value of the individual and joint payoff. Hence, 
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contrary to Hypothesis 12, certain variables can affect bargaining behaviors 
and outcomes no matter what level of information is available. 
Although it was not hypothesized that information would interact 
significantly with the other three independent variables, such an 
interaction occurred with three of the dependent variables (initial CL alt, 
final CL, and final CL alt). Examination of the dependent variables with 
regard to the particular treatment condition which included low-information, 
strategy formation, group preparation, and the buyer role, indicates a 
rather consistent result. Compared to the other l6 treatment conditions, 
buyers, who prepared for the bargaining in groups, who formed a strategy, 
and who had low-information, had the highest initial CL, the second 
highest initial CL alt, the highest final CL and CL alt, the second highest 
estimate of the opponents* CL, and highest estimate of the opponents' CL 
alt, the highest initial bid, the largest payoff-final CL difference, and 
used the most deceptions. Of course, only three of the four-way inter­
actions were significant, but the consistency across analyses suggests that 
the four independent variables can interact to a certain extent to raise 
bargainers expectation and to affect behavior and bargaining outcomes. 
Slegel and Fouraker 
The data are In substantial agreement with those of Slegel and 
Fouraker (19^)0). As reported by the above authors, low-Information 
bargainers were less realistic, less equitable, took more time to reach 
agreements, and achieved lower mutual payoffs. As already mentioned, 
Slegel and Fouraker compared the effects of incomplete versus complete 
Information on bargaining. The present data, then, indicate that results 
similar to those of Slegel and Fouraker are obtained when comparing two 
levels of incomplete information. 
Thibaut and Kelley 
For the most part, the hypotheses derived from Thibaut and Kelley's 
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(1959) theory of dyadic interaction, concerning the effects of information 
on bargaining, were supported. This study provided an important test for 
the theory, because no one in the past, including Thibaut and/or Kelley, 
has compared the effects of different levels of incomplete Information. 
Therefore, this study went beyond a mere description of the effects of one 
level of information in a particular mixed-motive situation (as in e.g., 
Kelley, 19^6), to a comparison of the degree of the effects associated 
with different degrees of information. The extrapolations from the 
theory were successful in predicting many of the effects on bargaining 
behavior and outcomes due to different levels of information. Thus, as 
predicted, low-information bargainers had higher initial expectations of 
payoffs, took longer to reach agreements, attempted to deceive their 
opponents more often, and received lower individual and joint payoffs than 
high-information bargainers. 
The theory did not successfully predict the results associated with 
two dependent variables! it led to incorrect predictions concerning the 
levels of the GL alt's; and it failed to predict how the values of the GL' 
would change as the bargaining progressed. 
There were no main effects due to any of the independent variables on 
the settings of the Initial CL alt, opponent's GL alt, and final GL alt. 
Nevertheless, subjects did, on the average, set their Initial GL alt's 
above the $1.00 alternative which was provided (as predicted). The 
average initial GL alt was about $2.00, 
4? 
With regard to the initial GL alt, it seems that more low-information 
bargainers, having no referent for the CL alt, chose the $1.00 alternative 
provided in the instructions (in fact 30 out of 72 low-information 
bargainers chose the $1.00 GL alt, as opposed to 23 out of 72 high-
information bargainers; x - 4.64, d.f, - 1, p ^ .0^). On the other hand, 
high-information bargainers, who were aware of the payoff contingencies, 
chose a value of GL alt near the $2.70 mutual maximum. The data indicate 
that 18 out of 72 high-information bargainers chose a CL alt within + 150 
of $2.70, while no low-information bargainers' GL alt's were that close to 
$2,70 (x^ - 20.57, d.f. « 1, p<1.0l). Therefore, it is evident that 
subjects did not choose their GL alt's on the basis of what they thought 
their opponents GL's were, as the theory predicted. 
Thibaut and Kelley's theory also failed to predict how the GL's would 
change during the bargaining as a function of the level of information. 
It was expected that low-information bargainers would maintain a higher CL 
than high-information bargainers throughout the bargaining. However, it 
was found that low-information bargainers lowered their GL's during the 
bargaining so that their fl'nal GL's were significantly lower than were the 
high-information bargainer's final GL'n. 
Therefore low-information bargainers expected and received lower 
payoffs (originally it was thought that the lower predicted payoff would 
be due to a more, not less, adamant bargaining stance, which would lead to 
less optimum solutions, more deadlocks and withdrawals, and thus, lower 
payoffs). 
One can only speculate why low-information bargainers reduced their 
GL's to such a great extent In the course of the bargaining. One possible 
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answer is related to information. Initially, low-information bargainers 
had only their own matrix values upon which to base a judgment concerning 
expected payoff. Bids from one's opponent represented a new source of 
information input. Since the bids of low-information bargainers were 
generally high, the corresponding profits for their opponents were very 
low. Thus this new information input told the bargainers that they would 
make very little profit if they were to accept their opponents offers. It 
is reasonable to expect that after the reception of several such unattractive 
bids, the bargainers would begin to lower their expectations. There are 
other possible explanations also. For instance, having one's bids rejected 
continuously over a relatively long period of time might induce one to 
lower payoff expectations. Possibly both of these explanations are valid; 
however, future research will be needed to settle the issue. 
The failures in prediction with regard to the initial and final CL 
alt, and the final CL, were related to failures in prediction for three 
other dependent variables. Contrary to expectation, low-information 
bargainers did not have larger payoff-final CL differences, did not 
express less satisfaction, and were not involved in more deadlocks and 
withdrawals. Since in the low-information condition, the final CL's 
were significantly lower (not higher as predicted) than in the high-
information condition, and since payoffs were also lower in the low-
information condition, one would not have expected (contrary to prediction) 
that low-information bargainers would have a significantly higher payoff-
final CL difference. Similarly, since the theory of Thibaut and Kelley 
states tl-iat satisfaction depends on the payoff-final CL difference, one 
could not expect differences in satisfaction due to different levels of 
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information. 
Similarly, since there were no differences in the GL alt level due to 
information level, the theory would predict that there should be no 
differences in the number of deadlocks and withdrawals due to information 
level. 
In other words due to the unexpected results with regard to the initial 
and final CL alt, and the final GL, the fact that information level had no 
effect on payoff-final GL difference, satisfaction, and bargaining break­
downs was actually consistent with the theory. Thus, although nonsignif­
icant results do not offer very strong support for a theory, in this case, 
they were at least consistent with it. 
In summary, Thibaut and Kelley's theory was successful in predicting 
certain aspects of the bargaining stance, bargaining behavior and bargaining 
outcomes. However, it failed to specify the effect of information on the 
establishment of minimally acceptable payoff values. Finally, it did not 
lead to correct predictions concerning the changing expectation of payoff 
in the course of the bargaining, A more precise statement concerning the 
effects of bargaining Interaction on bargaining expectations is needed to 
make more accurate predictions. 
It should be mentioned also that there occurred a measurement 
problem with regard to the final GL and GL alt. Each bargainer was asked 
to state a second GL and CL alt after a total of eight bids. In general, 
the values of the seconfi GL and GL alt were reduced from their original 
value. However, many high-Information bargainers formed agreements before 
the eighth bid (21 out of 36 dyads). Thus for those bargainers, the initial 
GL's and GL alt's had to serve as their final GL's and CL alt's also. 
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Consequently the measure of the final GL and CL alt was not as precise as 
It might have been. 
Kelley 
Kelley (1966) hypothesized that bargaining behavior could be explained 
in terms of dilemmas caused by conflict between informational needs about 
opponents and the reluctance to divulge information about oneself. According 
to KelleyJ these dilemnas lead to long bargaining times, deceptions, high 
expectations of payoff and other various behavioral results. It was hypoth­
esized in this study, on the basis of Kelley's analysis, that increased 
information would reduce the informational and behavioral dilemmas and thus 
ameliorate any deleterious effects on the bargaining due to lack of 
information. It was also hypothesized that increased Information would 
reduce effects on the bargaining due to strategy formation, group 
preparation, and assumption of a particular bargaining role. 
The data supported the expectation with respect to the buyer-seller 
role for several variables such as initial GL and final GL. Thus, buyers 
had higher expectations of payoff than the sellers, but this difference 
was reduced as Information was increased. The prediction was also 
supported for group-Individual preparation in relation to the number of 
bids. Nevertheless, increased information did not reduce differences in 
initial bid due to strategy versus no-strategy formation; nor were 
differences In total and individual payoff due to group versus individual 
preparation reduced by increased information. These results cast doubts 
on the assumption that all bargaining behavior can be explained in terms 
of dilemmas caused by lack of information. Apparently certain different 
types of prenegotlatlon experience can have differential effects on 
bargaining behavior which are not ameliorated by added information. 
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Group Versus Individual Preparation 
Summary of results 
Contrary to predictions, group-preparation "bargainers did not set 
higher initial GL's or CL alts did not take a longer time to bargain, did 
not have larger payoff-final GL differences, and did not express less 
satisfaction with the bargaining interaction than did individual prepara­
tion bargainers. There were some positive results also. Group-preparation 
bargainers needed more bids to reach a solution. Also, as hypothesized, 
they had more bargaining breakdowns and received lower joint and individual 
payoffs than individually prepared bargainers. 
Risky-shift and UBO 
It was interesting that the negative results were associated with 
hypotheses derived on the basis of the "risky shift" phenomenon. 
Contrary to expectation, group preparation bargainers were not riskier 
with respect to their initial CL's, GL alt's and final GL's and GL alt's. 
This might have been due to the fact that in this study subjects actually 
participated in a task in which their riskiness (or lack of it) had real 
potential effects on the subjects' outcomes. In past "risky shift" 
research, the traditional measure of riskiness has been a rating of 
behavioral intention for a hypothetical situation. In any event the 
"risky shift" phenomenon seems to be situation bound. 
In contrast, two results were consistent with expectations derived 
on the basis of the UiiO (unequivocal behavior orientation) concept. Thus 
group preparation elicited the type of adamant bargaining behavior which 
could be attributed to the establishment of a UBO. Specifically, group-
preparation bargainers required more bids to reach a solution and were 
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involved in more bargaining breakdowns. Both of these results can be 
interpreted as a reluctance to yield from a particular bargaining 
position due to group-preparation effects on the establishment of a UBO, 
Due to the fact that group-preparation bargainers were involved in 
more deadlocks and withdrawals for which they received the $1.00 
alternative payoff, they averaged significantly lower payoffs than 
individual-preparation bargainers. In addition, negative correlations 
were found between number of bids and individual and joint payoffs (r - -»3^t 
p <^,01} r - -.51f p-<.01, respectively). Thus, in general, the longer 
the bargaining duration (in terms of number of bids) the lower the payoff. 
Strategy Versus No-Strategy Formation 
Summary and interpretation of results 
The hypothesized longer bargaining times and more numerous deadlocks 
for those bargainers who formed a pre-bargalning strategy did not occur. 
Therefore, the effects of strategy on bargaining behavior found by Druckman 
(1967, 1968) and 3ass (19^6) were not replicated. Apparently when the 
variable of information input into the bargaining is controlled (which it 
was not in the Bass and Druckman studies), strategy-formation no longer 
has the hypothesized effects. 
Specifically, it is proposed that the unilateral strategy condition 
of the Bass and Druckman studies was comparable to the low-information 
condition of the present study (unilateral strategy bargainers conceivably 
only discussed their own side of the issues). Similarly, bilateral study 
or discussion vras comparable to the hi%h-information condition in the 
present study. Therefore, informational differences alone could have 
accounted for the Bass and Druckman results, Instead of strategy formation. 
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Strategy formation did have a significant effect on the level of the 
initial "bids and on the number of bargainers who deceived their opponents. 
Thus, "bargainers who formed a pre-bargaining strategy had higher initial 
bids and a greater tendency to deceive their opponents than bargainers 
who did not form a strategy. 
In summary, strategy-formation had no effects on the bargaining 
stance or bargaining outcomeso It did affect certain relatively 
unimportant bargaining behaviors. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Results 
All three of the naln Independent variables (low versus high-
information, group versus individual preparation, and strategy versus 
no-strategy) had significant effects on the bargaining. Information had 
the most important influence, affecting nine out of 15 dependent variables 
from the initial expectancies to the final joint payoffs. Group-
preparation had the second greatest influence but its effects were 
concentrated in the final stages of the bargaining. Thus group-preparation 
did not affect expectations, but rather bargai.ilng duration and payoffs. 
Strategy-formation had the sirallest and a rather superfluous effect on the 
bargaining in terms of the level of initial bids and the number of 
individuals using deception. It had no effect on bargaining expectancies, 
times, or outcomes. 
The bargaining role was found to interact with the level of information 
for several variables such as the initial and final expectancies of payoff. 
Increased information roduced the differences in expectancies between the 
buyers and sellers. Group prenegotiation experience was also found to 
interact with the level of information in relation to the number of bids. 
Group-preparation bargainers required more bids to reach agreements than 
individual preparation bargainers when relatively little information 
about opponents' bargaining positions was available. Increased information 
reduced this difference. 
It was also found that proncgotiation oxpcrionco had effects on the 
bargaining which were not reduced by increased information. For instance, 
bargainers who formed a strategy before the bargaining, began with higher 
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Initial bids than those not forming a strategy, regardless of the level 
of information. Similarly, group-preparation bargainers received less 
payoff than those who prepared individually, at both levels of information. 
It can be concluded that information has a considerable effect on 
the type of behavior exhibited in a mixed-motive situation; and, in 
general, increased information leads to more realistic expectations, faster 
resolution of the mixed-motive conflict, less attempts at deception, and 
higher payoffs. In addition, prenegotiation experience can have 
significant effects on bargaining behavior and outcomes. Preparation for 
bargaining in a group, and formation of a definite strategy can lead to 
more adamant bargaining in terms of more deceptions, longer bargaining 
duration, more deadlocks, and poorer outcomes. These results can occur 
despite possible increases in information. Finally, the level of 
Information can interact with prenegotiation experience so that conclusions 
concerning the effect of prenegotiation experience on certain variables 
are valid only for specified levels of information. 
Theory 
Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) exchange theory did quite well in 
predicting bargaining behavior, especially with regard to the information 
variable. The theory .shows great promise of a model for dyadic inter­
actions. The concepts of CL and CL alt, if suitably operationalized, lead 
to precise, non-obvious and testable predictions. 
Improvements in the theory, however, are also needed. To successfully 
predict behavior throughout the course of bargaining the theoiy will have 
to be refined so that it can predict how the values of the CL and CL alt 
will change during the course of the bargaining. Without such refinements. 
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accurate predictions of such variables as bargaining time, deadlocks, 
and satisfaction will be impossible. 
To summarize briefly, the "rislqr shift" phenomena and the effects 
of strategy formation discussed by Druckman (196?# 1968) and Bass (1966) 
were not observed. However, Kelley's (1966) analysis of the bargaining 
situation in terms of informational and behavioral dilemmas found some 
support. Finally, Jones and Gerard's (19^ 7) concept of UBO was also 
consistent witn the data. 
Implications 
The majority of past research dealing with mixed-motive or bargaining 
situations has ignored the effects of prenegotiation activity or information 
or both. The present study casts doubt on the validity of such research. 
It is evident that both prenegotiation and information variables have 
significant effects on bargaining behaviors and outcomes; also the two 
types of variables interact in some instances. The implication is that 
mixed-motive situations are more complicated than previously thought. 
Theories which attempt to explain bargaining behavior solely as a function 
of either the objective characteristics of the situation (such as the 
amount of inforrration available), or solely in terms of prenegotiation 
experience are necessarily incomplete. 
Although it is tempting to conclude, on the basis of the present data, 
that increased information will have beneficial effects for all individuals 
in all mixed-motive conflicts, one must keep in mind the unique character­
istics of the present bargaining situation. For instance, bargainers had 
equal power over one another (in that either could withdraw), all had the 
same alternative of $1.00, and in each bargaining dyad both bargainers had 
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equal Information about one another. These equalities preclude safe 
generalizations to situations where the equalities do not exist. The 
great effect of information in this study, however, certainly warrants 
future research on the importance of information in different types of 
mixed-motive situations. 
Finally, as already mentioned, exchange theory provides a promising 
conceptual tool for the analysis of mixed-motive situations. However, 
the present study indicates that better ways must be found to opera-
tionalize the two basic concepts of the theory, the CL and the CL alt. 
The theory will be useful only to the extent that successful operations 
for these constructs can be found. 
58 
LITERATURE CITED 
Bass, B, M, Effects on the subsequent performance of negotiators of 
studying issues or planning strategy in groups. Psychological 
Monographs, 1966» ^ 0 (6, Whole No. 6l4). 
Bern, D, J., Wallach, M. A., & Kogan, N, Group decision-making under risk 
of aversive consequences. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 19^ 5» 1, ^ 53-^ 0» 
Goser, L. Peaceful settlements and the dysfunctions of secrecy. The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1963, 7, 3^ 9-3^ 7• 
Cunmings, L. L., & Harnett, D. L. Bargaining behavior in an asymmetric 
triad: the role of information, communication, and risk-taking 
propensity. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1969* 
Druckman, D. Dogmatism, prenegotiation experience, and simulated group 
representation as determinants of dyadic behavior in a bargaining 
situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967» 6, 
279-290, 
Druckman, D. Prenegotiation experience and dyadic conflict resolution in 
a bargaining situation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
1968, 4, 367-383. 
Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, 111,: Row, 
Peterson, 1957. 
Harnett, B. L., Gummln^s, u. L., & Hughes, G. D. The influence of risk-
taking propensity on bargaining behavior. Behavioral Science, I96R, 
13, 91-101. 
Harsanyi, J. C. Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility 
function. The Journal of Conflict Hesolution, 1962, 6, 1-4. 
Harsanyi, J. C. Some social-science implications of a new approach to 
game theory. In Kathleen Archibald (Ed.), Strategic interaction and 
conflict. Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, I966, 
Ikle, F". C., & Leites, N. Political negotiations as a process of 
modifying utilities. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, 6, 
19-28. 
Jones, E. E., & Gerarr], H. E. Foundations of social psychology. New York; 
John Wiley & Sons, I967. 
Kelley, H. H. A classroom study of the dilemmas in interpersonal 
negotiations. In Kathleen Archibald (Ed.), Strategic Interaction 
and conflict, Berkeley? Institute for Internatj onal Studies, 1966. 
59a 
Kelley, H, H,, Beckman, Linda L,, & Fischer, G, S. Negotiating the 
division of a reward under Incomplete information. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology. 19^ 7, 3» 361-398» 
Kelley, H, H,, & Thibaut, J. W. Group problem solving. In G. Lindzey 
E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969» 
Kuhn, H. W. Game theory and models of negotiation. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 19^ 2, 6, 1-4. 
Liebert, R. M., Smith, W. P., Keiffer, Marian, & Hill, J, H. The effects 
of information and magnitude of initial offer on interpersonal 
negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 1968, 4, 
431-441. 
Marquis, D. G. Individual responsibility and group decisions involving 
risk. Industrial Management Review, 19^ 2, 3, 8-23. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Drews, Julie, L. The effect of time pressure, time 
elapsed and the opponent's concession rate on behavior in 
negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 
43-60. 
Quandt, R. E. On the use of game models in theories of international 
relations. World Politics, I96I, l4, 69-76. 
Rokeach, M. The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books, I96O. 
Schelling, T. G. The strate^ / of conflict, Cambridge, Mass.* Karvanl 
University Press, I96O, 
Siegel, 3., & Fouraker, L. E, Bargaining and group decision making. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 196O, 
Stevens, G, M, Strategy and collective bargaining negotiations. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, I963, 
Thibaut, J, W,, & Kelley, H. H, The social psychology of groups. New 
York; John Wiley & Sonn, 1959» 
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, C, Theory of games and economic behavior. 
(3rd ed,) Princeton, N, J,: Princeton University Press, 1953. 
Wallach, M. A., Kogan, N,, & Bern, D, J, Group influence on individual 
risk-taking. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 
6$, 75-86. 
Walton, R, S., & McKersle, R. B, A behavioral theory of labor negotiations. 
New York: McGraw-Hill 5 1965» 
59b 
Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York; 
McGraw-Hill, I960. 
60 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my appreciation to those individuals without 
whose advice and encouragement this dissertation could not have been 
possible. They include Dr. Arthur G, MacKinney, Dr. Donald H, Schuster, 
Dr. Vayne H. Bartz, Dr. Harold W. Davey, and Dr, Thomas F. Lyons, In 
addition, special acknowledgment must be given to Dr. Arnold Kahn who 
worked closely with me In all phases of this study from the initial 
conceptualization to the final draft. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to my wife, but she refuses to type another word. 
6l 
APPENDIX Al PAYOFF MATRICES 
Matrix 1» Buyer's guide 
Quantity 
Price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Buyer's Profit 
$1.20 
1.15 .04 .03 .00 
1.10 .08 .13 .15 .14 .22 .00 
1.05 .14 .23 .30 .34 .32 .30 .25 .12 ,00 
1.00 .18 .33 .45 .54 .58 .60 .60 .52 .45 
.95 .24 .43 .60 .74 .82 .90 .95 .92 .90 
.90 .28 .53 .75 .94 1.08 1.20 1.30 1.32 1.35 
.85 .34 .63 .90 1.14 1.32 1.50 1.65 1.72 1.80 
.80 .38 .73 1.05 1.34 1.58 1.80 2.00 2.12 2.25 
.75 .83 1.20 1.54 1.82 2.10 2.35 2.52 2.70 
.70 .48 .93 1.35 1.74 2.08 2.40 2.70 2.92 3.15 
.65 .54 1.03 1.50 1.94 2.32 2.70 3.05 3.32 3.60 
.60 .58 1.13 1.65 2.14 2.58 3.00 3.40 3.72 4.05 
.55 .64 1.23 1.80 2.34 2.82 3.30 3.75 4.12 4.50 
.50 .68 1.33 1.95 2.54 3.08 3.60 4.10 4.52 4.95 
.45 .74 1.43 2.10 2.74 3.32 3.90 4.45 4.92 5.40 
.40 .78 1.53 2,25 2.94 3.58 4.20 4.80 5:32 5,85 
.35 .84 1.63 2.40 3.14 3.88 4,50 5.15 5.72 6.30 
.30 .88 1.73 2.55 3.34 4.08 4.80 5.50 6.12 6.75 
.25 .94 1.83 2.70 3.54 4.32 5.10 5.85 6.52 7.20 
.20 .98 1.93 2.85 3.74 4.58 5.40 6.20 6.92 7.65 
.15 1.04 2.03 3.00 3.94 4.82 5.70 6.55 7.32 8.10 
.10 1.08 2.13 3.15 4.14 5.08 6.00 6.90 7.72 8.55 
.05 1.14 2.23 3.30 4.34 5.32 6.30 7.25 8.12 9.00 
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Quantity-
Price 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Buyer's Profit 
$1.20 
1.15 
1.10 
1.05 
1.00 
.95 
.90 
.85 
.80 
.75 
.70 
.65 
.60 
.55 
,50 
.45 
.35 
.30 
.25 
.20 
.15 
.10 9.35 10.06 10.80 11.50 12.11 12.75 13.36 13.86 14.40 
.05 9.85 10.62 11,40 12.16 12.81 13.50 I4.l6 14.70 15.30 
.35 
.85 
1.35 
1.85 
.16 
.72 
1.26 
1.82 
.00 
.60 
1.20 
1.80 
.46 
1.10 
1.76 
.21 
.91 
1.61 
.00 
.75 
1.50 
.56 
1.36 
.26 
1.10 
.00 
.90 
2.35 
2.85 
3.35 
3.85 
2.36 
2.92 
3.46 
4.02 
2.40 
3.00 
3.60 
4.20 
2.40 
3.06 
3.70 
4.36 
2.31 
3.01 
3.71 
4.41 
2,25 
3.00 
3.75 
4.50 
2.16 
2.96 
3.76 
4.56 
1.96 
2.80 
3.66 
4.50 
1.80 
2.70 
3.60 
4.50 
4.35 
4.85 
5.35 
5.85 
4.56 
5.12 
5.66 
6.22 
4,80 
5.40 
6,00 
6,60 
5.00 
5.66 
6.30 
6.96 
5.11 
5.81 
6.51 
7.21 
5.25 
6.00 
6.75 
7.50 
5.36 
6,16 
6.96 
7.76 
5.36 
6,20 
7.06 
7.90 
5.40 
6.30 
7.20 
8,10 
6.35 
6.85 
7.35 
7.85 
6.76 
7.32 
7.86 
8.42 
7 #20 
7.80 
8.40 
9.00 
7.60 
8.26 
8.90 
9.56 
7.91 
8,61 
9.31 
10,01 
8.25 
9.00 
9.75 
10.50 
8.56 
9.36 
10,16 
10.96 
8.76 
9.60 
10.46 
11.30 
9.00 
9.90 
10,80 
11.70 
8.35 
8.85 
8.96 
9.52 
9.60 
10.20 
10.20 
10.86 
10.71 
11.41 
11.25 
12.00 
11.76 
12.56 
12.16 
13.00 
12,60 
13.50 
Matrix 2, Seller's guide 
Quantity 
Price 123456789 
Seller's Profit 
$1.20 1.15 2.20 3.15 4.00 4,75 5.40 5.95 6,40 6,75 
1.15 1.10 2.10 3.00 3.80 4,50 5.10 5.60 6,00 6.30 
1.10 1.05 2.00 2.85 3.40 4,25 4.80 5.25 5.60 5.85 
1.05 1.00 1.90 2,70 3.40 4.00 4.50 4.90 5.20 5.40 
1,00 
.95 1.80 2.55 3.20 3.75 4.20 4.55 4,80 4,95 
.95 .90 1.70 2,40 3.00 3.50 3.90 4.20 4,40 4.50 
.90 .85 1.60 2.25 2.80 3.25 3.60 3.85 4,00 4.05 
.85 .80 1,50 2.10 2.60 3.00 3.30 3.50 3.60 3.60 
,30 
.75 1.40 1.95 2.40 2.75 3.00 3.15 3.20 3.15 
.75 .70 1.30 1.80 2.20 2.50 2.70 2.80 2,80 2.70 
.70 .65 1.20 1.65 2,00 2.25 2,40 2.45 2 M 2,25 
.65 .60 1.10 1.50 1.80 2,00 2.10 2.10 2,00 1.80 
.60 
.55 1.00 1.35 1.60 1.75 1.80 1.75 1,60 1.35 
.55 .50 .90 1.20 1.40 1.50 1.50 1,40 1,20 .90 
.50 .45 .80 1.05 1.20 1.25 1.20 1.05 ,80 .45 
.45 .40 .70 .90 1,00 1.00 .90 .70 .40 ,00 
.35 .60 •75 .80 •75 .60 •35 .00 
.35 .30 .50 .60 .60 .50 .30 .00 
.30 .25 .40 .45 .40 .25 .00 
.25 .20 .30 .30 .20 .00 
.20 
.15 .20 .15 .00 
.15 .10 .10 .00 
.10 .05 .00 
.05 .00 
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Price 10 11 
Quantity 
12 13 14 
Seller's Profit 
15 16 17 18 
$1.20 7.00 7.15 7.20 7.15 7.00 6.75 6.40 5.95 5.40 
1.15 6.50 6.60 6,60 6.50 6.30 6.00 5.60 5.10 4.50 
1.10 6.00 6.05 6.00 5.85 5.60 5.25 4.80 4.25 3.60 
1.05 5.50 5.50 5.40 5.20 4.90 4.50 4.00 3.40 2,70 
1.00 5.00 4.95 4.80 4.55 4.20 3.75 3.20 2.55 1.80 
.95 4.50 4.40 4,20 3.90 3.50 3.00 2.40 1.70 .90 
.90 4.00 3.85 3.60 3.25 2.30 2.25 1.60 .85 .00 
.85 3.50 3.30 3.00 2.60 2.10 1.50 .80 .00 
.80 3.00 2.75 2.40 1.95 1.40 .75 .00 
.75 2.50 2.20 1.80 1.30 .70 .00 
.70 2.00 1.65 1.20 .65 .00 
.65 1.50 1.10 .60 .00 
.60 1.00 
.55 .00 
.55 .50 .00 
.50 .00 
.45 
.35 
.30 
.25 
.20 
.15 
.10 
.05 
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APPENDIX B; INSTRUCTIONS 
6? 
(The instructions for all l6 treatment conditions were basically the 
same. Of course there were minor differences depending on the level of 
information available and the bargaining role which was assumed. The 
instructions below were for the seller in the high-information condition.) 
Instructions 
This research project is supported by Graduate Support Funds. They 
have made money available for conducting this experiment. If you follow 
the instructions carefully, you will be able to make money which you can 
keep. The amount of money you win will depend on your performance. 
You have been assigned the role of a seller in a buyer-seller relation­
ship, Shortly you will bargain with a buyer. During the bargaining you 
will discuss possible agreements with regard to the selling of a product 
which we will call X, 
You have been given two tables of values which show the various profit 
levels you and the buyer can receive, and the prices and quantities that 
must be exchanged to reach certain levels of profit. Across the top of 
each table are the various quantities of X; along the left-hand side are 
listed various prices. The numbers in the body of the tables represent 
the profits associated with the various combinations of price and quantity. 
The possible price-quantity choices for the buyer and seller are the same; 
however, the profits for various price-quantity choices are generally 
different. 
The buyer's table is derived from what he can distribute profitably, 
and therefore his profit varies inversely with price. That is, the lower 
the price, the higher the buyer's profits. For example, consult the 
buyer's table and observe how his profit levels (in the body of the matrix) 
decline as the price he pays for product X rises. In contrast, your 
seller's table is derived from your costs and reflects the condition 
that your profits vary directly with price. Thus as the price of product 
X rises, so do your profits. Notice in your seller's matrix how your 
profits rise in direct relation to the price. Nevertheless, to make any 
of the profits listed in the table, you must agree on both price and 
quantity. If you cannot agree, you can receive a profit of $1.00 by 
breaking off the discussion. In other words, assume that an agreement 
with some other buyer will yield a profit of $1.00. The individual you 
are negotiating with can also break off the negotiations, and accept his 
alternative profit. Your opponent's alternative may or may not be the 
same as yours. In any event, it is in your interest to get the largest 
possible profit since this is the amount you will take home. The 
profit you earn will be either that specified in your table by a price-
quantity agreement or your $1.00 alternative. 
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The following steps outline the procedure to be followed» 
1, The buyer will initiate the bidding. 
2, The bid will be in terms of price and quantity, 
3, You should start bargaining from a position which is favorable 
to you, since you will probably have to make concessions to 
reach an agreement, 
4, Bargaining is done in good faith (i,e., once an offer is given 
it cannot be withdrawn). 
5, Once an offer is given, it will either be accepted or a 
counter-offer made. This process of offer and counter-offer 
will be continued until an agreement is reached or until one 
player decides to withdraw, 
6, Bids are made by verbally telling the buyer your price and 
quantity offer. (Decisions to withdraw are also verbally 
given, at which time bargaining stops,) 
7, The only thing you must tell your opponent is the price and 
quantity of your offer. If you wish, you may also tell him 
your alternative, but you need not. Some players have aisked if 
you must tell the truth. Your offer must be truthful (price and 
quantity), but whether you tell the truth about your alternative 
is up to you, 
8, Nothing else besides the price, quantity, alternative and (if 
appropriate) the decision to withdraw may be verbalized, 
9, You will be allowed 30 minutes to make an agreement. If you 
fail, you will receive your $1,00 alternative, 
10, You will now be given 5 minutes to study the matrices, and to get 
an adequate understanding of the bargaining situation. You are 
not to form a bargaining strategy at this time or make a final 
decision about how you will bargain, 
11, Are there any questions? 
(These additional instructions were given to the group preparation 
bargainers,) 
The three of you will be paired with three Buyers, In other words, 
each of you will bargain separately with a different Buyer. Also you will 
not be communicating again with one another after this initial preparation. 
After the experiment, the group whicn has collectively negotiated the 
highest total profit will be considered the best group. After the 
bargaining, I will tell you individually how well your group did. However, 
any money that is won Is to be kept by the individual who wins it. The 
profits will not be shared by the group. The job of the three of you is 
to confer with one another in order to best understand the bargaining 
situation and to prepare your group to bargain most effectively. You will 
be given 5 minutes to confer. Do not attempt during this time to form a 
definite collective bargaining strategy. 
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APPENDIX G: STRATEGY QUESTIONNAIRE 
70 
Now that you have had 5 minutes to study the situation, you will be 
given 5 additional minutes to form a strategy. On the spaces provided 
below, write down the following Information* 
1. The price-quantity value of your first bid. 
Price Quantity 
2, If your first offer is not accepted, what will your second 
offer be? 
Price Quantity 
3. What is the final offer you will make, that is, the offer which, 
if not accepted, will result in your withdrawal from the 
bargaining? 
Price Quantity 
4, What profit do you expect to make in the bargaining? 
$ 
5» What is the lowest profit you will accept? 
$ 
6, How much time within the 30 minute time limit do you expect 
the bargaining to last? 
Time 
7o Will you attempt to Increase your profits by inaccurately 
communicating your alternative to your opponent? 
Yes No 
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APPENDIX D; POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
72 
Please answer these questions briefly# 
Age J 
Year in school: 
Did you believe that money would actually be given? 
Are you satisfied with the amount of money you won? If not, why? 
If told not to form a strategy, did you, in fact, form some type of 
tentative strategy anyway? If so, what was that strategy? 
Did you find this experiment interesting or boring? 
Do you think your opponent was a fair bargainer? 
Did you think you could win more money by cooperating or competing with 
your bargaining partner? Give a reason for your answer. 
If you prepared for the bargaining in a group, did the group have any 
effect on your bargaining approach? 
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APPEÎIDIX E; SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
Instructions 
On the following sheet are pairs of words which are opposite in meaning, such as Responsible and 
Irresponsible. You are asked to describe your opponent by placing a check in one of the spaces on 
the line between the two words» 
Responsible» i i t i i t » i Irresponsible 
Extreme- Very Quite More More Quite Very Extreme­
ly re- respon- respon- respon- irre- irre- irre- ly irre-
spon- sible sible sible spon- spon- spon- sponsible 
sible than sible sible sible 
irre- than 
spon- respon­
sible sible 
For example : If you think of your partner as being quite responsible, you would put a check 
in the third space from the word responsible, like this: 
Responsible: : : i t : x « : Irresponsible 
If you think of your partner as somewhat more responsible than irresponsible. you would put your 
check on the responsible side of the middle, 
Responsible: i : t » i irresponsible 
If you thought of your partner as extremely irresponsible, you would use the space nearest the 
word irresponsible. 
Responsible: : : : i _i i : -'sx i Irresponsible 
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Look at the words at both ends of the line before you put in your 
check mark. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. 
Work rapidly» your first answer is likely to be the best. Please do not 
omit any items and mark each item only once. 
friendly j j i : i i t «unfriendly 
good I I I I I I I I bad 
unenthusiastic t t : i » : i t enthusiastic 
fair J I : j i i » (unfair 
insincere i i t « : : i » sincere 
close ( ( I I I J i «distant 
cold t ! I J I J I jwarm 
pleasant i t i : » t t : unpleasant 
flexible t t t i » t : i rigid 
supportive j i t t j t t ihostile 
cheerful : i i i i i j «gloomy 
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APPENDIX F» DOGMATISM SCALE 
77 
Instructions 
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels 
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best 
answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to 
cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself 
agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as 
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you 
agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people 
feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you 
agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1, +2, +3» or 
-1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case. 
+li I AGREE A LITTLE -li I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
+21 I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2; I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
+31 I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. 
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form 
of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent. 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better 
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes. 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place. 
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to 
solve my personal problems. 
9. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in. 
10. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future. 
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop. 
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12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself 
several times to make sure I am being understood, 
13» It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward, 
14. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret 
ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, 
or Shakespeare, 
15. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something 
important. 
16. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the 
world, 
17» In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful 
of really great thinkers, 
18. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the 
things they stand for. 
19. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really 
lived, 
20, It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that 
life becomes meaningful, 
21, Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there 
is probably only one which is correct, 
22, A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely 
to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person, 
23. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because 
it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side, 
24, When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be 
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently 
from the way we do, 
25, In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he 
considers primarily his own happiness, 
26. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the 
people who believe in the same thing he does. 
27. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard 
against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than 
by those in the opposing camp. 
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28. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its 
own members cannot exist for long. 
29. There are two kinds of people in this worlds those who are for 
the truth and those who are against the truth, 
30. Ify blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's 
wrong. 
31. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath 
contempt, 
32. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the 
paper they are printed on, 
33# In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know 
what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be 
trusted. 
34, It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on 
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one 
respects, 
35* In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and 
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own, 
36. The present is all too often full of unhappiness; it is only 
the future that counts. 
37. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes 
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all." 
38. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed 
important social and moral problems don't really understand what' 
going on. 
39» Most people just don't know what's good for them. 
40. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed In what I 
am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are 
saying. 
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APPENDIX GJ ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE DEPENDENT MEASURES 
81 
Table 8, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Initial CL 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 25.18 1 25.18 15.42 
B Strategy 1.14 1 1.14 .70 
C Group vs. Individual 0.03 1 0.03 .02 
D Buyer-Seller 13.88 1 13.88 8.50 
AB 1.05 1 1.05 .64 
AG 0.74 1 0.74 .45 
AD 8.51 1 8.51 5.21 
BC 0.48 1 0.48 .29 
BD 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
CD 0.25 1 0.25 0.15 
ABC 0.59 1 0.59 0.36 
ABD 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
ACD 3.96 1 3.96 2.43 
BCD 0.08 1 0.08 0.05 
ABCD 2.94 1 2.94 1.80 
Error 208.94 128 1.63 
Total 267.77 143 
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Table 9» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Initial CL 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer $4.9^  $2,89 
Group 
Seller $3.17 $3.34 
Strategy 
Buyer $3.8? $3.60 
Individual-
Seller $3.40 $2.89 
Buyer $4,44 $2,89 
Group 
Seller $3.17 $2.67 
No Strategy-
Buyer $4.33 $2.91 
Individual-
Seller $3.42 $2.86 
83 
Table 10. Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Initial GL alt 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 0.22 1 0.22 0.22 
B Strategy 0.21 1 0.21 0.21 
C Group vs. Individual 0.77 1 0.77 0.77 
D Buyer-Seller 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 
4B 1,00 1 1.00 1.00 
AC 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
AD 1.03 1 1.03 1.03 
BG 3.65 1 3.65 3.64 
BD 0.41 1 0.41 0.41 
CD 0.43 1 0.43 0.43 
ABC 0.87 1 0.87 0.8? 
ABD 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
AGD 3.87 1 3.87 3.86 
BCD 0.00 1 o.oc 0.00 
ABCD 5.45 1 5.45 5.44 
Error 128.28 128 1.00 
Total 146.22 143 
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Table 11. Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Initial CL alt 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer $2.$8 $1,62 
Group 
Seller $1.92 $2,73 
Strategy 
Buyer $1.34 $2.13 
Individual 
Seller $1.90 $1.6l 
Buyer $2.06 $1.86 
Group 
Seller $1.98 $1.99 
No Strategy-
Buyer $2.56 $1.93 
Individual 
Seller $2.12 $1.96 
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Table 12, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Opponent's GL 
Sourc* Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 27.40 1 27.40 9.07 
B Strategy 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
G Group vs. Individual 2.15 1 2.15 0.71 
D Buyer-Seller 0.60 1 0.60 0.20 
AB 4.50 1 4.50 1.49 
AG 1.75 1 1.75 0.58 
AD 20.09 1 20.09 6.65 
BC 0.16 1 0.16 0,05 
BD 0.21 1 0.21 0.07 
CD 5.91 1 5.91 1.95 
ABC 0.07 1 0.07 0.02 
ABD 1.92 1 1.92 0.64 
ACD 0.83 1 0.83 0.27 
BCD 1.66 1 1.66 0.55 
ABCD 0.38 1 0.38 0.12 
Error 386.77 128 3.02 
Total 454.41 143 
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Table 13» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Opponent's CL 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer $4.^ 6 $2,64 
Group 
Seller $2.76 $3.00 
Strategy 
Buyer $3.83 $2,6$ 
Individual 
Seller $3.47 $4.15 
Buyer $4,56 $2.38 
Group 
Seller $3.39 $2.76 
No Strategy 
Buyer $4.11 $2.80 
Individual 
Seller $3.83 $3.05 
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Table 14, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Opponent's CL alt 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 0.14 1 0.14 0.14 
B Strategy 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 
G Group vs. Individual 1.08 1 1.08 1.11 
D Buyer-Seller 0.18 1 0.18 0.18 
AB 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 
AG 0.45 1 0.45 0.46 
AD 2,88 1 2.88 2,96 
BC 3.56 1 3.56 3.66 
BD 0.05 1 0.05 0.05 
CD 0.03 1 0.03 0.03 
ABC 1.49 1 1.49 1.53 
ABD 1.15 1 1.15 1.18 
ACD 1.66 1 1.66 1.70 
BCD 0.16 1 0.16 0.16 
ABGD 0.83 1 0.83 0,86 
Error 124.42 128 0.97 
Total 138.10 143 
88 
Table 15» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Opponent's CL alt 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer $2.56 $1.56 
Group 
Seller $1,6? $2.32 
Strategy 
Buyer $1,86 $1.78 
Individual 
Seller $1.89 $2.00 
Buyer $1.6l $1.72 
Group 
Seller $1.59 $2.03 
No Strategy 
Buyer $2,39 $1.99 
Individual 
Seller $2,42 $2,10 
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Table l6. Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the First Bid 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 263.84 1 263.84 32.09 
B Strategy 77.97 1 77.97 9.48 
C Group vs. Individual 23.05 1 23.05 2.81 
D Buyer-Seller 404.74 1 404.74 49.22 
AB 0.10 1 0.10 0.01 
AG 0.63 1 0.63 0.08 
AD 45.70 1 45.70 5.56 
BC 1.23 1 1.23 0.15 
BD 26.49 1 26.49 3,22 
CD 11.03 1 11.03 1.34 
ABC 7.77 1 7.77 0.95 
ABD 2.86 1 2.86 0.35 
AGO 0.71 1 0,71 0.09 
BCD 14.64 1 14.64 1.78 
ABGD 0.94 1 0.94 0.11 
Error 1052.56 128 8.22 
Total 1934.32 143 
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Table 17« Cell means for the analysis of variance of the First Bid 
Low-Information HiRh-Infor nation 
Buyer $11.63 $9.03 
Group 
Seller $ 5.68 $4.1? 
Strategy 
Buyer $10.35 $5.95 
Individual 
Seller $ 6.18 $4.08 
Buyer $ 9.44 $4.91 
Group 
Seller $ 5.59 $3.93 
No Strategy 
Buyer $ 8.55 $4.74 
Individual 
Seller $4.58 $3.54 
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Table l8. Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of Time 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 0.104 1 0.104 24.82 
B Strategy 0,005 1 0,005 1.20 
C Group vs. Individual 0,000 1 0,000 0.00 
AB 0.005 1 0.005 1.23 
AC 0,002 1 0,002 0.53 
BC 0,003 1 0,003 0.91 
ABC 0,005 1 0.005 1.40 
Error 0.269 64 0.004 
Total 0,395 71 
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Table 19# Cell means for the analysis of variance of Time 
Low-Information High-Information 
Group 0.05 0.14 
Strategy 
Individual 0,0? 0.10 
Group 
No Strategy 
Individual 
0.05 
0.06 
0.14 
0.16 
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Table 20, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Number of Bids 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 758$.01 1 7585.01 56,21 
B Strategy 4.01 1 4,01 0,03 
G Group vs. Individual 654,02 1 654.02 4.85 
AB 91.12 1 91.12 0,68 
AC 618.35 1 618.35 4.58 
BC 95,68 1 95.68 0,71 
ABC 10,12 1 10,12 0,08 
Error 8635,88 64 134.94 
Total 17694,20 71 
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Table 21, Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Number of Bids 
Low-Information HlRh-Informatlon 
Group 34.44 11,55 
Strategy 
Individual 26,11 14,44 
Group 
No Strategy 
Individual 
39.78 
26,33 
11,89 
8.67 
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Table 22, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of Deceptions 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 4.86 1 4.86 11.54 
B Strategy- 0.15 1 0.15 0,36 
C Group vs. Individual 0.05 1 0.05 0,12 
D Buyer-Seller 0.48 1 0.48 1.15 
AB 0,08 1 0,08 0.18 
AG 0,00 1 0,00 0.00 
AD 0.42 1 0,42 1.00 
BC 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
BD 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 
CD 0,42 1 0,42 0.99 
ABC 0,14 1 0.14 0.33 
ABD 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
AGD 1.13 1 1.13 0.30 
BCD 0,00 1 0.00 OoOO 
ABCD 0,01 1 0,01 0.03 
Error 53.87 128 0,42 
60.63 143 
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Table 23. Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Deceptions 
Low-Information HlKh-Information 
Buyer 1,64 1,11 
Group " ••• 
Seller 1,2? 1.04 
Strategy 
Buyer 1.46 1.13 
Individual 
Seller 1,41 1.21 
Buyer 1,58 1,04 
Group 
Seller l.l6 1,00 
No Strategy 
Buyer I.5I 1,00 
Individual 
Seller 1.45 1.00 
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Table 24. Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Final CL 
Source Sun of Squares M Mean Square F 
A Information 1.77 1 1.77 4.20 
B Strategy 0.70 1 0.70 1.65 
G Group vs. Individual 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 
D Buyer-Seller 8.81 1 8.81 20.89 
AB 0.03 1 0.03 0.07 
AG 0.19 1 0.19 0.46 
AD 8.62 1 8.62 20.45 
BG 0.42 1 0.42 0.99 
BD 0.56 1 0.56 1.34 
CD 0.23 1 0.23 0.55 
ABC 0.44 1 0.44 1.04 
ABD 0.81 1 0.81 1.93 
AGD 1.54 1 1.54 3.64 
BCD 0.13 1 0.13 0.31 
ABGD 3.02 1 3.02 7.18 
Error 53.95 128 0.42 
Total 81.24 143 
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Table 25. Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Final CL 
Low-Information Hiffh-Information 
Buyer $3.63 $2,72 
Group 
Seller $1,73 $3.10 
Strategy 
Buyer $2.94 $2,96 
Individual 
Seller $2.32 $2,62 
Buyer $2.84 $2,65 
Group 
Seller $2.19 $2,52 
No Strategy 
Buyer $2.85 $2,86 
Individual 
Seller $2.08 $2.93 
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Table 26» Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Final CL alt 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 0.12 1 0.12 0.21 
B Strategy 0.22 1 0.22 0.37 
C Group vs. Individual 0.66 1 0.66 1.11 
D Buyer-Seller 2.02 1 2.02 3.40 
AB 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 
AC 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 
AD 9.98 1 9.98 16.77 
BC 2.20 1 2.20 3.70 
BD 0.15 1 0.15 0.25 
CD 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 
ABC 0.15 1 0.15 0.25 
ABD 0.38 1 0.38 0.63 
ACD 2.31 1 2.31 3.88 
BCD 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 
ABGD 4.73 1 4.73 7.95 
Error 76.15 128 0.59 
Total 99.13 143 
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Table 27» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Final CL alt 
Low-Information High-Infornation 
Buyer $2.99 $1.74 
Group 
Seller $1.44 $2.68 
Strategy 
Buyer $1.90 $2.06 
Individua] 
Seller $1.59 $1.77 
Buyer $2.11 $1,88 
Group 
Seller $1.58 $1.98 
No Strategy 
Buyer $2.33 $1.80 
Individual 
Seller $1.66 $2.20 
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Table 28, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Individual Payoff 
Source Sum of Squares M Mean Square F 
A Information 1.10 1 1.10 3.01 
B Strategy 0.19 1 0.19 0.53 
C Group vs. Individual 2.09 1 2.09 5.72 
D Buyer-Seller 2.53 1 2.53 6.93 
AB 0.01 1 0.01 0.03 
AG 0.81 1 0.81 2.22 
AD 2.33 1 2.33 6.38 
BC 0.05 1 0.05 0.15 
BD 0.34 1 0.34 0.93 
CD 0.09 1 0.09 0.25 
ABC 0.02 1 0.02 0.06 
ABD 1.13 1 1.13 3.09 
ACD 0.18 1 0.18 0.50 
BCD 0.08 1 0.08 0.23 
ABCD 0.95 1 0.95 2.60 
Error 46.74 128 0.36 
Total 58.66 143 
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Table 29. Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Individual 
Payoff 
Low-Information HiRh-Information 
Buyer $2,66 $2.42 
Group 
Seller $1.78 $2.58 
Strategy 
Buyer $2.98 $2.6? 
Individual 
Seller $2,2? $2.64 
Buyer $2.24 $2.77 
Group 
Seller $2.33 $2.^ 4 
No Strategy 
Buyer $2.96 $2.66 
Individual 
Seller $2,38 $2.70 
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Table 30, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Joint Payoff 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square P 
A Information 2.20 1 2.20 3.16 
B Strategy 0.39 1 0.39 0.56 
G Group vs. Individual 4.18 1 4.18 6.01 
AB 0.02 1 0,02 0.03 
AC 1.62 1 1.62 2.33 
BC 0.11 1 0.11 0.16 
ABC 0.04 1 0.04 0,06 
Error 44.52 64 0.70 
Total 53.09 71 
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Table 31. Cell means for the analysis of variance for the Joint Payoff 
low-Information High-Information 
Group 4.44 5 «00 
Strategy 
Individual $«2$ 5*31 
Group 
No Strategy 
Individual 
4.58 
5.33 
5.31 
5.37 
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Table 32. Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Payoff-Final CL Difference 
Source Sum of Squares Û1 Mean Square F 
A Information 0.04 1 0.04 0.06 
B Strategy 1.42 1 1.42 2.30 
C Group vs. Individual 1.50 1 1.50 2.44 
D Buyer-Seller 1.6? 1 1.67 2,71 
AB 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 
AG 2.02 1 2.02 3.28 
AD 2.23 1 2.23 3.61 
BC 0.63 1 0.63 1.03 
BD 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 
CD 0.49 1 0.49 0.80 
ABC 0.53 1 0.53 0.85 
ABD 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 
AGD 3.06 1 3.06 4.95 
BCD 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
ABCD 0.72 1 0.72 1.16 
Error 79.09 128 0.62 
Total 93.45 143 
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Table 33* Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Pay off-Pinal 
CL Difference 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer $-0,97 $-0,19 
Group 
Seller $ 0.04 $-0,52 
Strategy 
Buyer $ 0,03 $-0,29 
Individual 
Seller $-0.05 $ 0,02 
Buyer $-0,59 $ 0,12 
Group 
Seller $ 0,14 $ 0,03 
No Strategy 
Buyer $ 0,10 $-0.20 
Individual 
Seller $ 0,30 $-0,23 
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Table 34, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Semantic Differential 
Source Sum of Scores Mean Square F 
A Information 148.03 1 148.03 1.53 
B Strategy 14.69 1 14.69 0.15 
G Group vs. Individual 113.78 1 113.78 1.18 
D Buyer-Seller 289.00 1 289.00 2.99 
AB 361.00 1 361.00 3.74 
AG 103.36 1 103.36 1.07 
AD 420.25 1 420.25 4.35 
BC 46.69 1 46,69 0.48 
BD 294.69 1 294.69 3.05 
CD 44.44 1 44,44 0.46 
ABC 5.44 1 5.44 0.06 
ABD 128.44 1 128.44 1.33 
AOD 14.69 1 14.69 0.15 
BCD 6.25 1 6.25 0.06 
ABCD 13.44 1 13.44 0.14 
Error 12359.10 128 96.56 
Total 14363.34 143 
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Table 35» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Semantic 
Differential 
Low-Information High-Information 
Buyer 55.78 59.11 
Group 
Seller 67.33 57.56 
Strategy 
Buyer 54,89 59.89 
Individual 
Seller 65.33 62.22 
Buyer 56.22 61,67 
Group 
Seller 56.22 58.56 
No Strategy 
Buyer 56.33 64.33 
Individuals 
Seller 59.33 64.33 
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Table 36, Source table and significance tests for the analysis of 
variance of the Dogmatism Scale 
Source Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
A Information 680.34 1 680.34 1.18 
B Strategy 15.34 1 15.34 0.03 
G Group vs. Individual 836.17 1 836.17 1.45 
D Buyer-Seller 556.17 1 556.17 0.96 
AB 175.56 1 175.56 0.30 
AC 430.56 1 430.56 0.74 
AD 60.06 1 60.06 0.10 
BG 29.34 1 29.34 0.05 
BD 327.00 1 327.00 0,56 
CD 556.17 1 556.17 0.96 
ABC 50.17 1 50.17 0.09 
ABD 788.67 1 788.67 1.36 
AGD 112.01 1 112.01 0.19 
BCD 473.06 1 473.06 0.82 
ABCD 572(00 1 572.00 0.99 
Error 73968.38 128 577.88 
Total 79631.38 143 
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Table 37» Cell means for the analysis of variance of the Dogmatism 
Scale 
Low-Information High-Informatlon 
Buyer - 8,56 0,67 
Group 
Seller 3.78 -10.44 
Strategy 
Buyer -11.67 - 4.6? 
Individual 
Seller -10.22 - 3.6? 
Buyer - 1.11 - 2.44 
Group 
Seller - 7.33 2.56 
No Strategy 
Buyer -I8.89 -11.22 
Individual 
Seller - $.$6 4.44 
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APPENDIX HI CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Table 33. Correlation matrix for the dependent variables 
12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 l.OC .65 .41 .09 .50 -.11 -.03 ,48 
-.33 ,10 -.19 .26 -,20 .11 
2 1.00 .33 .59 .66 ,02 ,02 ,22 -.31 .00 -,03 .04 -.13 -.07 
1.00 .67 .22 .29 .00 ,02 .25 -,66 .34 .14 .05 -.04 .07 
- 1.00 ,26 .4.9 .01 ,10 .29 -,38 .30 -.09 .06 —. 04 .07 
1.00 ,66 -, 12 -,09 .33 -,20 .02 -.22 .29 -.15 .19 
: 1.00 ,01 ,01 .17 -.28 .00 —. 08 .08 -«13 .02 
T' 1,00 .05 -.19 ,08 .10 .18 -.25 .16 -.24 
S 1,00 -,10 
-.19 -.22 .02 .02 -.20 -.01 
1.00 -,11 .14 — .21 .27 -.14 .06 
i: 1,00 .47 -.13 -.24 .57 -,12 
11 1.00 .00 -.34 .67 -.03 
12 1.00 -;60 .01 -.27 
1? 1,00 -.51 .32 
1-' 1.00 -.11 
1": 1,00 
Note: A correlation of .l6 if; significant at the .05 level. 
A correlation of .21 is significant at the .01 level. 
N - iWi. 
1) iL-iitial GL 9) First Bid 
2) Initial CL alt 10) Payoff-Final GL Difference 
3) Final GL 11) Individual Payoff 
Final GL alt 12) Reciprocal of Time 
5; Cpponent GL 13) Number of Bids 
6 ' Cpponent GL alt 14) Total Payoff 
7) SeTantic Differential 15) Deceptions 
6) Dogmatism Scale 
